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PARTISAN REDISTRICTING
"High Court Upholds Texas Redistricting
In rejecting Democrats' charge of 'partisan gerrymandering,' the justices give lawmakers
wider power to redraw lines for their parties."
The Los Angeles Times
June 29, 2006
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court gave politicians legal
license Wednesday to aggressively redraw
election districts to benefit the party in
power, as it upheld the mid-decade
redistricting plan engineered by former
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay and
other Texas Republicans.
By clever line-drawing, DeLay and the
Texas Legislature-with both houses newly
under GOP control in 2003-remade its
delegation in Congress, turning a 17-15
Democratic majority into a 21-11
Republican majority in 2004.
The bold move signaled an escalation in
partisan warfare.
Before, the redrawing of electoral districts
had been a once-a-decade battle that
followed the release of new census numbers.
Under the Constitution, states are required to
adjust district lines to account for population
changes. Wednesday's ruling means they
may redraw the lines whenever they choose,
as long as they do not violate voting rights
laws.
Legal experts and political strategists said
the ruling would encourage Republicans in
other GOP-dominated states to redraw their
districts to gain more seats.
It is not clear whether Democrats will be
able to do the same. In the ruling, the court
emphasized that the Voting Rights Act
generally forbade splitting up blocs of
minority voters. That makes it harder to
create more Democratic districts.
Mary G. Wilson, president of the League of
Women Voters, called the decision
"extremely disappointing," saying it would
encourage politicians to become serial
mapmakers. "We now can expect an even
more vicious battle between the political
parties as they redraw district lines every
two years for partisan gain," she said.
The partisan nature of redistricting has
inspired efforts to take the process out of the
hands of lawmakers. Last year, California
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed to
give a panel of retired judges the task of
redrawing electoral districts, but voters
rejected the idea.
Gerrymandering is hardly a new
phenomenon. The word came from an 1812
cartoon that portrayed a district drawn by
Massachusetts Gov. Elbridge Gerry as
resembling a salamander. In recent decades,
computers have given politicians an ever
more powerful tool to shape the outcome of
elections by shifting voters among districts.
In the past, the Supreme Court has struck
down "racial gerrymandering" and said the
Constitution generally bars officials from
making decisions based on race.
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Politics is another matter, and although
many Supreme Court justices have voiced
unease over brazenly partisan
gerrymandering, they have never struck
down a redistricting plan as too partisan.
On Wednesday, a five-member majority said
DeLay's plan, even if it were drawn for a
purely partisan purpose, did not violate the
Constitution and its guarantee of equal
protection under the law. But the court did
find one district to be illegally drawn
because it diluted Latino voting power. The
overall ruling applies to other electoral
districts as well, including those for state
legislatures.
Electoral districts are usually drawn by
politicians in state capitals, the justices
noted, and it is hard to say when such a
politically drawn plan becomes too partisan.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
the court, cited two other
upholding the Texas plan.
speaking for
reasons for
First, he said, the task of redistricting
belongs to elected legislators. In 2001, a
panel of federal judges redrew the Texas
districts because the state Legislature-then
divided between a Republican Senate and a
Democratic House-could not agree on a
plan. So the plan pressed by DeLay in 2003
was the first to win the approval of the
state's elected legislators.
"There is nothing inherently suspect about a
legislature's decision to replace mid-decade
a court-ordered plan with one of its own,"
Kennedy said.
Second, he said, it is not clear that DeLay's
plan was less fair than the Democratic-
friendly plan it replaced.
Before 2003, Democratic leaders had used
their power in Austin to preserve a
Democratic majority in the state's
congressional delegation, even as most
Texans voted for Republicans. Four years
ago, 59% of Texans voted Republican and
41% Democratic in statewide tallies, yet
more Democrats than Republicans won
election to the House of Representatives.
By this measure, DeLay's plan "can be seen
as fairer" than the one it replaced, Kennedy
said.
The court's four conservatives-Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A.
Alito Jr.-joined Kennedy in rejecting the
charge of "partisan gerrymandering" against
the Texas Republicans.
At the same time, Kennedy joined with the
four liberal justices-John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer-to rule that one
southwest Texas district was drawn illegally
in a way that hurt Latino voters.
The Voting Rights Act of 1982 forbids
officials from "diluting" the power of
minority voting blocs, and Kennedy said
Texas lawmakers violated that provision
when they shifted 100,000 Latino voters to
shore up the reelection prospects of Rep.
Henry Bonilla, a Republican who has been
unpopular with Latino voters.
The Texas Legislature split Webb County,
which is 94% Latino, between Bonilla's 23rd
District and a neighboring district.
This ruling requires the Texas Legislature-
or perhaps a panel of judges-to redraw that
district, which will force others to be
changed. The court's decision to uphold the
mid-decade redistricting plan, despite its
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objections to how one district was drawn,
was the second defeat for liberal reformers
this week.
On Monday, the court rejected a move by a
group of reformers to lessen the impact of
money in politics. They had strongly
defended a novel Vermont law that set low
spending caps for state candidates, but the
Supreme Court, in a 6-3 ruling, struck it
down as a violation of the 1st Amendment.
Good-government activists also joined the
Texas case, hoping it could lead to
competitive election contests that would be
decided by the voters, not by the politicians
who drew the districts.
Typically, politicians draw districts that
have a comfortable majority of Republicans
or Democrats, so the outcomes are
essentially foregone conclusions.
Ken Mehlman, chairman of the Republican
National Committee, called the ruling "a
victory for Texas voters and the Republican
Party." He added that it "confirmed that the
current Texas map is fair under any
standard."
J. Gerald Hebert, a lawyer for the Texas
Democrats pressing the case, said he was
dismayed the court had turned a blind eye to
an "extreme example . . . of raw partisan
politics."
The decision "opens the floodgate for
partisan redistricting," he said. "The court
has essentially ceded the field .. . and state
legislatures have largely been given a free
hand to do what they will with congressional
districts."
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"Justices Express Concern Over Aspects of Some Texas Redistricting"
The New York Times
March 2, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
Texas Democrats had their day in the
Supreme Court on Wednesday to challenge
the unusual middecade redistricting of the
state's Congressional delegation that led to
the loss of five Democratic seats and helped
solidify Republican control of Congress.
While the Democrats may not come away
completely empty-handed, it appeared
unlikely by the end of the intense two-hour
argument that a majority of the court would
overturn the 2003 redistricting plan, or any
other plan, for that matter, as an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
The new districts were drawn under a plan
that was engineered by Representative Tom
DeLay of Texas, then the House majority
leader, after Republicans gained control of
both houses of the Texas Legislature. And
they are not necessarily invulnerable.
Several justices, including, most
significantly, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
who may be in a position to cast the
deciding vote, expressed concern with
aspects of how particular districts were
dismantled and reconfigured.
As a result, it appeared possible that the
court would find a violation of the Voting
Rights Act or the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee in the way the new
lines were drawn in South Texas. The
legislators removed 100,000 Mexican-
American residents of Laredo from a district
in which the Republican incumbent,
Representative Henry Bonilla, had become
more vulnerable with each passing election,
while creating a new Latino-majority district
in a narrow strip running 300 miles from
Austin to the Mexican border.
Justice Kennedy, addressing R. Ted Cruz,
the Texas solicitor general, called the new
district "a serious Shaw violation," a
reference to the court's landmark 1993 case,
Shaw v. Reno, that opened such oddly
shaped districts to challenge as racial
gerrymanders. The removal of the Mexican-
Americans from the Laredo district, leaving
the Latino population a bare statistical
majority there but not numerous enough to
control electoral outcomes, was an "affront
and an insult," Justice Kennedy said.
Texas is holding its primary election
Tuesday, and the Supreme Court's
disapproval of even one of the 32
Congressional districts, in a decision that is
not likely to come until early summer,
would set off a new political scramble. But
the prospect that the justices would declare
the entire 2003 enterprise to be invalid
appeared slight.
After Paul M. Smith, arguing for the
Democrats, declared that the "whole map"
was unconstitutional as "wholly lacking in
any legitimate public purpose," Justice
David H. Souter seemed to be having second
thoughts about whether a political
gerrymander could go too far.
"The difficulty I have," Justice Souter said to
Mr. Smith, "is that it is impossible, and let's
even assume it's undesirable, to take
partisanship out of the political process." Mr.
Smith's position, Justice Souter said, might
"imply the illegitimacy of any redistricting."
499
Mr. Cruz, the Texas state lawyer, appeared
to make some headway in defending the
2003 redistricting as an appropriate effort to
counter "one of the most profoundly anti-
majoritarian maps in the country," as he
described the district lines drawn by the
state's Democratic-controlled Legislature
after the 1990 census.
Texas picked up two Congressional seats in
the 2000 census. Republicans had gained
control of the State Senate by then. The
divided Legislature deadlocked over
redistricting and left the job to a federal
court, which based the 2001 plan largely on
the one from a decade earlier. By drawing a
new plan in 2003, after winning the State
House, the Republicans were simply taking
back a legislative prerogative from the court,
Mr. Cruz said.
"The framers chose political checks for the
problem of partisan gerrymandering," he
said.
A special three-judge federal district court in
Austin upheld the redistricting last year. Of
seven appeals generated by that ruling, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear four,
consolidating them for two hours of
argument; the lead case is League of United
Latin American Voters v. Perry, No. 05-204.
Nina Perales of the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
arguing on behalf of Latino and black
voters, made the South Texas redistricting
the focus of her argument.
Texas violated the Constitution by "the
excessive use of race," Ms. Perales said,
particularly "to craft a razor-thin 50.9
percent Latino majority" in Mr. Bonilla's
23rd Congressional District. She said the
Legislature chose to retain the narrow
majority, down from 63 percent, to protect
Mr. Bonilla and "give the false impression of
Latino support."
Her argument brought the court into the
heart of one of the most complex issues of
voting rights law, the relationship between
race and partisanship in political
environments where race often serves as a
rough proxy for party affiliation.
While the state argued, and the district court
agreed, that the 100,000 Mexican-
Americans were shifted out of the district
because they were Democrats, Ms. Perales
told the justices: "We contend that the state
removed the Latino voters because they
were Latino." Leaving just enough Mexican-
Americans to create the "impression" of a
Latino-majority district was "cynical," she
said.
"What constitutional relevance does that
have?" Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
asked Ms. Perales, adding: "What's the
difference between 'being one' and 'looking
like one?"'
The chief justice continued: "You're asking
us to draw a very fine line. What's the magic
number? What's the number that changes it
from political nuance to a Hispanic-
opportunity district? Would it have been
better in your view if they had excluded
more Hispanics so it didn't 'look like' a
majority?"
Ms. Perales replied that each district must be
evaluated for its own circumstances but that
it was impermissible to "zigzag through
neighborhoods and streets" in an "egregious
use of race for its own sake." To uphold this
district, she said, would "give states free rein
to use race to manipulate outcomes."
Justice Antonin Scalia replied, "Of course
you want to use race to manipulate
outcomes, just sometimes."
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Justice Scalia made his views clear
throughout the argument. To Mr. Smith, he
said at one point: "Legislatures redraw maps
all the time for political reasons. To say it's
something horrible is ridiculous."
Further, Justice Scalia said, even if there was
a problem with middecade redistricting as a
general rule, any such rule should not apply
when a first redistricting after a new census
had been done by a court rather than a
legislature. "Surely that's a good reason" for
the legislature to redistrict when it chose to,
he said.
The plaintiffs are also challenging the
Legislature's dismantling of a Dallas-Fort
Worth district that had been represented for
13 terms by a Democrat, Martin Frost.
While the district had been only about one-
quarter black, black voters, through their
high participation in the Democratic primary
and their consistent support of Mr. Frost,
had been able to keep him in office while
most of the district's whites voted
Republican. The district court held that,
lacking a majority in the district, black
voters could not bring a challenge to the
district's dismantling under the Voting
Rights Act.
This was erroneous, Mr. Smith argued,
because the test under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act was whether a minority
group could effectively elect a candidate of
its choice.
This argument gained little traction. "I don't
see the limits of your principle," Justice
Kennedy said. And Justice Stephen G.
Breyer objected that because there were
"many, many districts where African-
American voters have influence on the
Democratic Party," such an interpretation
would greatly expand the reach of the
Voting Rights Act.
Mr. Smith tried to be reassuring, saying his
test would apply only when minority voters
actually could control, rather than simply
influence, electoral outcomes. "We're not
just asking for the Voting Rights Act to
become the Pro-Democrat Act," he said.
The Bush administration entered the case to
defend the lower court's interpretation of the
Voting Rights Act. Gregory G. Garre, a
deputy solicitor general, argued that black
voters did not, in fact, control the outcome
in the old district.
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"Justices Set For Redistricting Cases
Court considers Texas' revision of map after '02 GOP victories."
USA Today
February 28, 2006
Joan Biskupic and Jim Drinkard
The story of how Texas' congressional map
was redrawn in 2003 to favor Republicans is
wrapped in partisan politics, personal
vendettas and claims of racial bias. It's also a
saga that led U.S. Rep. Tom DeLay to step
down as House majority leader.
And now, the legal battle over Texas
redistricting has landed at the U.S. Supreme
Court, which on Wednesday will hear a set
of cases that could help determine how far
legislatures across the nation can go in
reshaping voting districts to favor the party
in power. The justices will hear arguments
on whether Texas' Republican-led
Legislature violated the U.S. Constitution
and federal voting rights law by unfairly
splitting up traditionally Democratic voting
districts.
At issue is a map that the Texas Legislature
drew up a year after Republicans achieved a
majority in the statehouse in 2002.
Normally, redistricting is done once a
decade, after the U.S. Census. A Texas map
was drawn by a federal court in 2001, but
Texas Republicans, capitalizing on their
just-won majority, passed a revised map in
2003 to help the GOP win more
congressional seats.
The plan worked. Before the new map was
used in the 2004 elections, Democrats held a
majority of Texas' 32 congressional seats,
17-15. Afterward, Republicans held 21
seats.
The Supreme Court traditionally has given
legislators wide latitude to draw maps to a
party's advantage, believing such political
business is the proper domain of elected
officials. But the Democratic challengers
argue that a mid-decade map drawn solely
for partisan gain violates principles of
constitutional equality and rights of political
association.
Advocates for minority voters, including the
Latino veterans' group GI Forum, argue
separately that Texas lawmakers
impermissibly broke up concentrations of
Latino and black voters for partisan goals.
Supreme Court justices have been narrowly
divided on voting rights cases through the
years, whether the disputes involved
allegations of racism or unfair partisanship.
In a 2004 ruling, the court signaled that it
soon might stop reviewing partisan
gerrymanders altogether.
"The court is at a crossroads ... where it's
being asked to intervene pretty aggressively
in the political process," says Richard L.
Hasen, a professor at Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles. "It has to make some
fundamental decisions on how much to
intervene in state races."
The Two Basic Issues
The four consolidated cases before the
justices raise several issues, but they boil
down to whether the Constitution bars mid-
decade redistricting for political gain, and
how judges should assess whether a state has
wrongly diluted the influence of minorities
in that effort.
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"The state of Texas enacted a new
congressional districting plan in 2003 for
one and only one reason: to engineer the
replacement of Democratic members of
Congress with Republicans," says Paul
Smith, a Washington lawyer who will argue
Wednesday on behalf of a group of Texas
Democrats. He says there was no lawful
need to change the 2001 boundaries.
"The use of governmental power solely to
help or hurt a particular political party's or
group's voters, based on . . . their speech or
beliefs, cannot be squared with the First
Amendment and the guarantee of equal
protection," he says.
Texas officials counter that state Democrats
are simply clinging to the remnants of their
old dominance in the state. "Texas' current
congressional map is the natural result of
four decades of Texas political history,
during which the voting preferences of
Texas voters have shifted decidedly," says
state Solicitor General Ted Cruz.
Texas, like much of the South, had been
realigning toward the Republicans for years
before the controversial map was drawn. But
Democrats, in part because of a map drawn
by their party in 1991, held most of the
state's U.S. House seats through the 1990s.
After the 2000 Census, Texas gained two
congressional seats, for a total of 32, and a
new round of redistricting began. The
Legislature, then with a Democrat-controlled
House and a Republican-controlled Senate,
was unable to agree on a map. A three-judge
federal court adopted a redistricting plan that
largely followed the 1991 map.
That frustrated DeLay, one of Texas' most
visible politicians and then the majority
leader of the U.S. House. He was irked that
Republicans were capturing a majority of
the state's popular vote in congressional
races but still had fewer House seats than
Democrats.
Victory Came At a Cost
DeLay set about to help Republicans take
control of the Legislature and the
redistricting process.
He established a political action committee,
Texans for a Republican Majority PAC, to
raise money for Republican legislative
candidates. The effort was successful, as the
Republicans captured the full Texas
Legislature in 2002. Then DeLay and his
allies pushed through the new district map.
"It was an extremely clever but very partisan
gerrymander" that diluted Democratic
districts while creating greater opportunities
for Republicans, says Richard Murray, a
political scientist at the University of
Houston.
Among the six Democrats who were forced
out during the 2004 elections were veteran
congressman Martin Frost of Dallas-a
longtime DeLay nemesis-and Rep. Nick
Lampson of Beaumont, who now is trying to
stage a comeback by running against DeLay.
The state GOP victory came at a cost to
DeLay, who was indicted in 2005 on a
campaign-finance-related charge, forcing
him to leave his post as the No. 2
Republican in the House. The indictment
alleges he directed illegal corporate
contributions to legislative candidates by
moving the money through the national
Republican Party. DeLay denies the charge.
The GOP plan also is being challenged by
minority groups, including the League of
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United Latin American Citizens. They claim
the Legislature boosted GOP candidates at
the expense of Latino and African-American
political strength, which the groups say
violated federal law designed to help those
who historically have faced bias.
The groups say the state squeezed what
could have been seven heavily Latino
districts into six districts, and also
dismantled a district in which Latinos had
strong influence.
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"First Thoughts On Voting Rights, Gerrymandering, and Texas"
SCOTUSblog
June 28, 2006
Rick Pildes
Rick Pildes of NYU Law School has these
thoughts on today's decision:
Today's complex opinion in the Texas case
is noteworthy for a number of reasons, some
more obvious, some more subtle. As a
practical matter, Democrats lost the war but
won a battle that might have important
partisan implications nonetheless. As a legal
matter, apart from its significance for current
law in the areas of race, politics, and the
Constitution, the decision will also have
direct implications for current debates in
Congress over whether to renew the Voting
Rights Act and if so, in what form, both to
address possible constitutional challenges to
the Act and to deal with the diversity within
new minority communities, such as the
Latino community, that the Court wrestles
with in this case.
Partisan Gerrymandering
This aspect of the case will get the most
attention, since it is both the easiest to
understand and has the dramatic personality
of Tom DeLay at the center. The Court held
that the hardball tactics Texas Republicans
used to redraw districts to increase
Republican power in the US House may
have been tough politics, but not in such a
way that the Constitution was violated. As
between the aggressive Democratic
gerrymander of Texas in the 1990s and the
Tom DeLay inspired gerrymander of today,
the Court majority essentially washed its
hands of the matter and concluded there was
no constitutional basis for choosing sides in
this ugly partisan warfare. The question now
will be whether this ruling triggers a similar
spiral of other mid-decade redistrictings
after this fall's House elections, the answer
to which might depend on how close the
balance of power turns out to be in the
House-and whether Democrats in states
like La, New Mexico and some other states
are willing to use the same hardball tactics
as DeLay prompted in Texas.
Looking forward on this issue, might
partisan gerrymandering violate the
Constitution in other contexts? Technically,
the answer remains yes, as it has for many
years now. Practically, though, the opinion
makes it less likely the Court will find an
actual violation. Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito once again signaled their
unwillingness to confront precedents they
did not have to address; showing a cautious
moderation, both refused to take positions
on the large question of whether partisan
gerrymandering is ever unconstitutional. But
Justice Kennedy rejected yet another effort
to craft such a standard. Because Justice
Kennedy has been more open to the
possibility of such a standard, his rejection
of every actual standard offered to him,
including the one today, makes it harder for
plaintiffs to win on partisan gerrymandering
claims.
Race, Ethnicity, and the Voting Rights
Act
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy, and a
majority in this case, clearly remained
disturbed about the extent to which current
officeholders manipulate the design of
election districts for their own self-interest.
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And partisan politics is deeply entangled
these days with race and ethnicity. Even
though the Court rejected the direct partisan
gerrymandering attack on Texas' plans, it
indirectly accepted part of that claim
through the route of focusing on the
manipulation of Latino voters in the Texas
plan. Republicans sought, for partisan
reasons, to dismantle one Hispanic district
and compensate (as they thought the Voting
Rights Act required), by creating a different
Hispanic district elsewhere. But the Court
majority rejected this attempt. As Justice
Kennedy concluded for the Court,
dismantling the first district would have
violated the Act, unless Texas had created a
new, legal Hispanic district to replace the
one dismantled. But Texas had not done so
because the new Hispanic district itself
violated the Act. Why did it do so? Because
the groups of Latinos put into the new
district-some in the Austin area, others
near the Mexican border-were located far
apart and, more importantly, had "disparate
needs and interests," according to the Court,
mostly because their economic status
differed considerably. This constitutes a
major, major innovation from the Court, one
that reflects the increasing skepticism to
grouping voters together based on racial or
ethnic identity. Justice Kennedy concludes,
in essence, that the Voting Rights Act does
not permit Latinos to be grouped as Latinos,
merely because they share Latino identity
and vote for Latino candidates, when they
otherwise differ in class status and location
in this way. Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito have laid down a major
marker on these issues, for in the Chiefs
separate opinion, he writes: "It is a sordid
business, this divvying us up by race." The
result in this case, and passages like this in
the various opinions, have direct
implications for the renewal of the Voting
Rights Act, which I will address in a
separate matter.
Immediate Practical Consequences
Given that the Texas plan is illegal and
elections are this fall, there are two options.
The Governor could call the legislature into
special session to draw a new plan for the
fall elections. Ironically, it was through just
such special sessions that the legislature
created the plan held illegal today. Texas's
legislators will thus end up devoting much
of the decade to drawing and re-drawing and
re-re-drawing a congressional districting
plan. When a new plan is drawn to comply
with the Court's decision, it is not clear at
this stage how if at all the partisan makeup
of the delegation might change.
Alternatively, Texas could ask the federal
court below to stay the decision and permit
it to hold elections under the illegal plan.
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"The Trouble With Texas"
The National Journal
March 4, 2006
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
A dispiriting reality sank in as the Supreme
Court worked through two hours of
arguments on March I about the egregious
gerrymander that Tom DeLay helped ram
through the Texas Legislature in 2003: The
Court has no intention of fixing-and no idea
how to fix-the mess that it has made of our
politics (with ample help from politicians)
over more than four decades. And nobody
else seems to have a good idea, either.
This mess is not just in Texas. Nor will it be
ameliorated by whatever the Court does in
the Texas case. Not even in the highly
unlikely event of a decision to strike down
the congressional redistricting map that
knocked off five Democratic incumbents in
2004, while delivering 21 of Texas's 32
House seats to Republicans, up from 15 in
2002.
The mess to which I refer is state
legislatures' use of gerrymandering-
manipulating election district lines to help or
hurt a particular candidate or group-to make
80 to 90 percent of the nation's 435 House
districts so lopsidedly Republican or
Democratic that the out party has almost no
chance of winning.
The paucity of competitive general elections
for House seats, bad enough in itself, has
also helped polarize our politics into the
bitter liberal-conservative brawling that
litters the landscape today. Primaries,
dominated by the most fervently partisan
voters, are the only real contests. So victory
goes to the most liberal of Democrats and
the most conservative of Republicans.
Moderates, who used to grease the wheels of
conciliation and compromise, have almost
disappeared.
The polarization that has poisoned the
House has also infected the Senate to a
lesser extent. Senators run statewide. But
many climbed the ladder by being liberal or
conservative enough to win in
gerrymandered House or state legislative
districts.
There will never be a better opportunity than
the Texas case for the Supreme Court to do
something about this. This is not because of
the much-publicized hijinks and other
particulars (described by National Journal's
Richard E. Cohen last week) of the DeLay-
driven decision to draw new districts to
defeat incumbent Democrats. It is because
the case raises all of the big questions that
bear on redistricting, and because it will be
the first opportunity for Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito to address
them.
Are partisan gerrymanders ever
unconstitutional? If so, how to decide how
extreme is too extreme? How many black-
controlled and Hispanic-controlled districts
must the state create (or preserve) to satisfy
the Voting Rights Act? Must states strive for
proportional representation of racial groups?
At what point do efforts to satisfy the Voting
Rights Act collide with the Court's equal
protection rules against drawing oddly
shaped districts with race as a "predominant
factor"?
The justices have made the law on all of
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these issues so confusing, so internally
contradictory, and so mind-numbingly
complex as to be almost incomprehensible.
But neither Roberts nor Alito, nor any other
justice, suggested any way for the Court to
improve the situation much, probably
because no way exists.
"Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket," Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote 60
years ago. If he and the Warren Court's
liberals are still in touch, Frankfurter must
be saying, "I told you so." The one-person,
one-vote decisions of the early 1960s have
had the unintended consequence of enabling
politicians to choose their voters rather than
the other way around.
Those decisions ended the gross
malapportionment of congressional and
legislative districts that had diluted the
voting power of urban voters in much of the
country. They also galvanized a national
consensus that every vote should have equal
weight. Indeed, when Alito was challenged
during his confirmation hearing to explain a
disapproving mention he made two decades
ago of the reapportionment decisions, he had
little choice but to endorse the one-person,
one-vote principle as "a fundamental part of
our constitutional law."
But Alito added a criticism of the Court for
"taking it to extremes, requiring that districts
be exactly equal in population, which did
not seem to me to be a sensible idea." He
was right.
So was Justice Lewis Powell, in a 1983
dissent warning that the Court's
"uncompromising emphasis on numerical
equality" would "encourage and legitimate
even the most outrageously partisan
gerrymandering." Requiring near-exact
numerical equality made a hash of the
traditional redistricting standards: city and
county lines, compactness, contiguity, and
the like. Those had been the only brakes on
gerrymandering.
Later, the justices' unduly broad reading of
the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments as
requiring safe seats for black and Latino
politicians led to the drawing of oddly
shaped "majority-minority" districts.
Politicians, under legal compulsion to draw
oddly shaped districts, have pursued their
own purposes while they were at it.
Meanwhile, computer software has allowed
the party in power to draw districts with
exactly the desired numbers of Democrats
and Republicans.
In California and other states, the two parties
have collaborated to draw safe districts for
as many incumbents as possible. This is
bipartisan gerrymandering. In Texas and
other states, the party in power has drawn
maps designed to entrench its own
incumbents while hurting those of the other
party. That is partisan gerrymandering.
The Court has sought since 1993 to undo
some of this damage by striking down a few
especially bizarre-looking racial
gerrymanders. But these decisions are easily
evaded, both because they bump up against
the Court's own Voting Rights Act rules and
because the Court allows redistricters to
pack mostly Democratic black voters into
bizarrely shaped districts as long as the
primary goal is to create safe Democratic
districts.
Meanwhile, a bare majority of the Court has
suggested that a sufficiently extreme
partisan gerrymander might be
unconstitutional, but the Court has never
struck one down.
In 2003, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the four more
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liberal justices wanted to strike down all or
part of a 2002 gerrymander that had given
Republicans 12 of the 19 House seats in
Pennsylvania, which had more registered
Democrats than Republicans. Four other
justices said that the Court should never
strike down a partisan gerrymander. Justice
Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote, said
that no manageable definition of unfairness
in redistricting had yet emerged, but he left
the door open for future cases.
Which brings us to the 2003 Republican
gerrymander in Texas. It is no more flagrant
than the Pennsylvania gerrymander.
Democrats, however, argue that it is
uniquely outrageous because the
Legislature's only reason for drawing a new
Texas map was partisan advantage.
The Legislature did not need to redraw the
map to comply with the one-person, one-
vote rule, the Democrats stress, because a
special three-judge federal district court had
already done that in 2001. (The Legislature
had deadlocked in 2001 without adopting
any map.) Ergo, say the Democrats, the
newly Republican Legislature's 2003 map
was a purely partisan move to hurt
Democratic incumbents and voters. Pretty
persuasive, thinks I.
But wait: The state counters that it redrew
the 2001 map to undo the lingering effects
of a 1991 Democratic gerrymander. It
enabled Democrats to win a 17-15 majority
of the congressional delegation in 2002,
even though Republicans had outpolled
Democrats by 53 percent to 44 percent
statewide. Even more persuasive, thinks I.
But wait again: The 2001 map had actually
given Republicans an advantage in 20 of the
32 districts, say the Democrats. They held
17 seats in 2002 only because the advantage
of incumbency had brought crossover votes
from Republicans. That clinches it, I
decided-until I was reminded that
incumbents tend to keep running for life, so
that the 2001 map might have perpetuated a
Democratic majority in a 60 percent
Republican state for the rest of the decade.
Perhaps you, dear reader, can clearly discern
from all this what would be the fairest
outcome. But I have given up. And most of
the justices seemed content to leave bad
enough alone. They also seemed likely to
reject most or all of the Democrats' claims
that this or that district had too few or too
many voters of this or that race.
Whatever the outcome, it would be nice if
the justices could tidy up a bit-bringing a
dollop of clarity to their rules, loosening the
one-person, one-vote straitjacket, reducing
the pressure to draw minority-controlled
districts even in places where minority
candidates have a fair shot without such
manipulations.
But it's hard to imagine the justices
inventing a new right to more-competitive
districts, or where in the Constitution they
could find it. Someone else will have to fix
this mess. Otherwise, we will be stuck with
it forever.
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"Comments on LULAC v. Perry"
SCOTUSblog
June 28, 2006
Daniel H. Lowenstein
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Professor of Law at
University of California, Los Angeles, has
these thoughts:
Today's Texas redistricting decision and
Monday's campaign finance decisions have
certain features in common. Most obviously,
the Court was badly fractured. Most
importantly, the Court stayed quite close to
the status quo on constitutional issues (as
opposed to the Voting Rights Act portions
of today's decision, which create new
doctrine). Perhaps most intriguingly, in both
cases the new justices positioned themselves
as moderate members of the conservative
bloc.
Although specialists have been dissecting
the campaign finance decision, Randall v.
Sorrell, for signs of change, the salient
features of that decision are that the
unconstitutionality of spending limits was
strongly reaffirmed and there was just a
slight nudge on contribution limits in the
direction of greater First Amendment
restriction. In my opinion, the latter was
necessary, because in Shrink Missouri the
Court extended permissiveness well beyond
anything Buckley v. Valeo had said. It is not
clear whether Randall sets a floor beneath
the Shrink Missouri abyss or goes further
and casts doubt on Shrink Missouri. Either
way, Randall is very much a reaffirmation
of Buckley.
On partisan gerrymandering, LULAC v.
Perry is even more clearly-though less
happily-a case that leaves us where we
were. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, a four-member
plurality would have overruled the holding
in Davis v. Bandemer that constitutional
claims against partisan gerrymandering are
justiciable, because there are no manageable
standards for deciding such claims. In three
separate opinions, four justices dissented,
each opinion proposing its own standard.
The pivotal vote was cast by Justice
Kennedy, who thought a manageable
standard might be discovered and therefore
was unwilling to find the claims
nonjusticiable. But he did not think any such
standard had been proposed and on that
ground denied relief.
In LULAC, the same four justices dissented,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, members of
the Vieth plurality, continued to hold the
claims unconstitutional. Kennedy wrote the
lead opinion, again saying that the question
is whether the appellants' claims offered "a
manageable, reliable measure of fairness."
The answer was that they did not. The only
difference was that Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito joined in this general
statement of the problem, though they did
not join Kennedy's discussion of the
particular deficiencies of the claims.
Whereas in Vieth we had a 4-1-4 split, in
LULAC it is 2-3-4. The important point is
that the median voter still says that the issue
is justiciable but the Court does not know
what the law is and therefore will not grant
relief.
As Scalia demonstrated in Vieth and as
Justice Stevens also points out in LULAC,
Kennedy's posture is profoundly
irresponsible. It is therefore disappointing to
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see Roberts and Alito taking the same
stance. However, in their case it is most
likely a holding action. They may want
some time and experience before taking a
clearer position. In the meantime, they are
situated on the left side of the conservative
bloc, which is where they sit right now on
campaign finance as well.
Where do the rest of us stand
constitutionally on partisan gerrymandering?
In a recently published article at 14 Cornell
J. Law & Public Policy 367, I came to the
surprising conclusion that, on the principle
that you cannot replace something with
nothing, Davis v. Bandemer is still good
law. If I was right in that analysis, I don't
see anything in LULAC that changes the
situation.
The novel constitutional issue that received
the most public attention was the mid-
decade issue. On that point, I believe
Kennedy was right to emphasize the
preferability of redistricting being effected
by legislatures rather than courts. I believe
the Court's conclusion that mid-decade
redistricting is neither unconstitutional nor
constitutionally suspect is correct. But that
does not mean mid-decade redistricting is
good. The best solution to this problem
would be a federal statute prohibiting a
legislature from drawing congressional
districts more than once in a decade. There
would have to be exceptions for when a plan
is declared invalid or in the case of a
referendum.
The Voting Rights Act issues are very
complex and I make only a few short points.
First, Kennedy folds some of the racial
gerrymandering concepts into his Section 2
analysis. This is bizarre, analytically
unsound for reasons demonstrated by
Roberts, and probably bodes no good.
Second, there is probably no good doctrinal
answer to why District 23 was struck down
and District 24 unsound. But there is a very
good impressionistic answer. In the
strongest portion of his opinion, Kennedy
tells a persuasive story that District 23 was
on the verge of becoming a Hispanic-
controlled district and that for partisan and
incumbent reasons the legislature snatched it
away. The story he tells on District 24 is that
the Democrats are using race as an
attempted way to save a prominent, white
Democratic representative.
Third, bringing the "quality" (or "style," in
Roberts' expression) of a district into the
Section 2 analysis is not good for politics or
for minorities. It is simply another restraint
on how the legislature must carry out its
legal obligations. This happened to be a
Republican legislature and a Republican
plan, but this decision will apply to
Democratic legislatures as well. And the
decision compounds one of the evils of the
racial gerrymandering cases, by limiting
minority legislators' flexibility to
accomplish their objectives as they wish.
I conclude on a note of tentativeness. I have
published exegeses of both of the Court's
prior partisan gerrymandering cases,
Bandemer and Vieth. In both cases, major
points became clear to me after repeated
readings and long consideration. It is quite
possible that on reflection and after hearing
what others have to say, I will have a
different view of L ULA C.
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"Ruling Has Texans Puzzling Over Districts"
The New York Times
July 22, 2006
Rick Lyman
Once upon a time, Congressional district
lines were redrawn once a decade, after each
federal census. But last month the Supreme
Court made it clear that redistricting could
occur far more often, and the resulting sense
of impermanence was on display this week
in a weather-beaten house on this city's
Hispanic, working-class South Side.
A few dozen people clustered around the
color-coded maps pinned to the wall, each
map showing the jigsaw patterns of how
South and West Texas' Congressional
districts might be redrawn in the next few
weeks. One keeps this part of southern
Bexar County in the 28th Congressional
District, another puts it in the 23rd, some
split it into both and one plan divides the
neighborhood among three districts.
"It's a mess," said Jimmie Casias, a military
veteran and school board official from
nearby Somerset. "And what's worst about
it, the way things are now, if whoever's
running things doesn't like the way an
election turns out, they can come back and
change the lines all over again."
The Supreme Court's 5-to-4 ruling said that
a 2003 redistricting plan, spearheaded by
Tom DeLay, the former leader of the
Republican majority in the House, was not
an unconstitutional gerrymander even
though it resulted in the defeat of four
Democratic incumbents. But the court also
ruled that one district, the 23rd, stretching
for 700 miles from Laredo to the outskirts of
El Paso was illegal under the Voting Rights
Act and needed 100,000 more Hispanics in
it to comply.
So, more than a dozen groups offered maps
last week to redraw the district and those
around it, including some that would
distinctly hamper the re-election prospects
of some Democratic and Republican
congressmen. A three-judge panel in Austin
will now have to decide what to do in time
for the midterm elections in November.
The partisan battle is on again, and it is no
longer clear whether it will ever stop.
"Redistricting is one of those areas that is
partisan by its very nature," said
Representative Henry Cuellar, a Democrat
who represents the 28th Congressional
District, stretching from Laredo to the
outskirts of San Antonio, and who, with two
Republican incumbents, Representatives
Henry Bonilla and Lamar Smith, offered
their own proposed map, one that has been
derided by critics as the "incumbent
protection plan."
But concern is rising that such revision will
be a regular occurrence across the country,
wherever a party firmly in control of a state
legislature believes an advantage can be
drawn.
"In the last 10 or 15 years, it's become
technically possible on a desktop computer,
with the right software, for anybody and
their uncle to generate their own very
sophisticated maps like this," said Calvin C.
Jillson, a political science professor at
Southern Methodist University. "So this
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allows interest groups, interested members
of Congress, political parties, pretty much
everybody to develop their own maps. This
has made the process a little more complex,
but a lot more open."
Of great concern to many Democrats is a
plan offered by the Texas attorney general,
Greg Abbott, on behalf of the state's
Republican leadership. It would draw the
lines in a way that imperils an incumbent
Democrat, Representative Lloyd Doggett of
Austin, and divides that most liberal of
Texas cities and surrounding Travis County
among three districts, all solidly Republican.
"It's completely overreaching, and it's
bizarre," said Alfred Stanley, a longtime
Democratic political consultant in Austin.
"This is just a vendetta against Lloyd
Doggett, who's been a thorn in their side for
years, and against Travis County, which
they hate."
Mr. Abbott declined to be interviewed.
Instead, a spokesman for his office passed
along a statement from the Texas solicitor
general, Ted Cruz, defending Mr. Abbott's
map.
"The proposed plan is directly responsive to
the Supreme Court's opinion upholding the
statewide map," Mr. Cruz said in his
statement. "It leaves 28 Congressional
districts completely untouched and alters
only District 23 and three adjoining
districts."
And alter District 23, it does-changing it
from a huge, largely Hispanic swath of the
South Texas borderlands, where Mr. Bonilla
was seen as vulnerable, to a handful of
counties northwest of San Antonio in the
predominantly non-Hispanic and Republican
Hill Country.
"What the Republicans did," Mr. Jillson said,
"is to come up with a way that gives all of
the Republican incumbents a good
opportunity to win again-including Bonilla,
who some people thought might be
endangered by this Supreme Court decision-
and at the same time take out yet another
Democratic incumbent. It's a very
aggressive, partisan map."
The question, he said, is whether the three-
judge panel or, on appeal, the Supreme
Court will decide that it goes too far.
Jose Garza, a lawyer for the League of
United Latin American Citizens, which is
offering two maps, said he and most others
involved in the case fully expected the
judicial panel to give deference to the
Republican leaders' plan, if for no other
reason than such panels have historically
done so. Either way, the losing side will
probably pursue an appeal that could
eventually head back to the Supreme Court.
Then there is the question of timing. The
three-judge panel has set oral arguments for
Aug. 3. The Texas secretary of state said a
map was needed by Aug. 8 for ballots and
precinct maps to be ready for the November
voting.
Will there be time for a primary before the
general election, or will there be an "open
primary" in November, a kind of free-for-all
of candidates followed by special general
election in the affected districts soon after?
Is there even time for a Supreme Court
appeal before November, or will the voting
take place under whatever map emerges
from the three-judge panel?
As the gathering in the South San Antonio
neighborhood of Harlandale showed, no
matter which map prevails, one candidate's
distress may be another's boon. The group
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was the second this week to have been
assembled by Ciro D. Rodriguez, one of the
Democratic incumbents who lost his seat in
2004, and who uses the small residence as
his makeshift office, keeping his political
apparatus alive.
The gathering had two purposes: to look at
the various maps and see how they affected
Hispanic voters, especially those in southern
Bexar County, and to see if any of the maps
were of particular help to Mr. Rodriguez's
political future.
One of the maps that might tempt Mr.
Rodriguez to run, though not his favorite, is
the Republican leaders' map. By edging Mr.
Doggett out of the 25th Congressional
District, it would provide an opportunity for
Mr. Rodriguez.
"There are a few of them that offer me some
real possibilities," he said. "But I'm not
going to be running if some of these plans
come out, especially if they break up Bexar
County too much."
And of concern to Mr. Rodriguez and others,
even beyond this round of partisan fighting,
is whether such jockeying will become a
regular part of the political calendar across
the country, perhaps even seeping down to
state and local races.
"I know some people look at what's
happening in Texas and say, Well, it's open
season on redistricting," Mr. Stanley said.
"But I'm hopeful that the bitterness that
people will see will cause them to reel back
in horror from trying this in their own
states."
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"New Texas Congressional Districts"
SCOTUSblog
August 4, 2006
Lyle Denniston
Responding to the Supreme Court's decision
partly nullifying a 2003 Texas congressional
redistricting plan, a special three-judge U.S.
District Court (Marshall Division) on Friday
drew up a new map that changes the
boundaries of five existing districts. The
District Court adopted its own plan, refusing
to embrace any of the 14 proposals
submitted to it. It acted one day after holding
a hearing on how to adapt the districts to the
Supreme Court's ruling June 28 in League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
(05-204, and companion cases). The District
Court order in case 03-354 is here, and its
opinion explaining the result is here.
It was obvious, from the swiftness of the
District Court's action, that it had been
redrawing the lines on its own before the
Thursday hearing. It was acting quickly
partly because Texas state officials had said
they needed a new plan by next Monday,
Aug. 7.
Only political analysts familiar with the
voting patterns of Texans will be able to
judge the actual political impact of the
changes on the Texas delegation in the
House, but the District Court said its new
plan (1438C) allows all incumbents to run
"in their old districts," with some
modifications. One potential impact of the
revision is to ease the chances of Democratic
Rep. Lloyd Doggett of the Austin area to
win reelection; the new map proposed by the
state GOP had wanted to split up his district
even more than it had been under the prior
plan. Another indication was that
Republican Rep. Henry Bonilla may have
less chance of being reelected in his newly
drawn District 23, because the District Court
has put more Latino voters back into that
district, and Latinos have been deserting
Bonilla in recent elections. It was because of
defections of Latinos that the GOP-
dominated legislature put together a plan to
take Latinos out of District 23, and put more
white Republicans into it.
Bonilla's District 23 was the only one
expressly found illegal by the Supreme
Court, under the Voting Rights Act, for its
impact on Latino voters in south Texas. The
District Court said its changes in that
district's lines "restore Latino voting
strength... .without dividing communities of
interest."
In order to implement its plan for this year's
election in the five newly crafted districts,
the District Court ordered a special election
under Texas law which provides for filling
vacancies in House seats, but it will be held
on the same day as other elections this year-
Nov. 7. Under the Court's order, candidates
must file to run for the House by Aug. 25,
the secretary of state must certify by Sept. 6
the names of candidates who will go on the
ballot for the five changed districts, and the
election will be held on Nov. 7. If no
candidate gets 50 percent of the vote in any
of the districts, a runoff date will be held.
Candidates for the state's other 27 House
seats chosen in primary elections in March
will remain on the general election ballot
(although whether former Republican Rep.
Tom DeLay will remain on the ballot in
District 22 in the Houston area is still at
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE
"Justices Reject Vermont's Campaign Finance Law"
The Washington Post
June 27, 2006
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court struck down Vermont's
strict limits on campaign contributions and
spending yesterday, in a splintered ruling
that left intact the constitutional basis of
current campaign finance laws but may
make it difficult to put new curbs on money
in politics.
Vermont's law, approved in 1997, was the
toughest in the country with regard to setting
limits on the amount individuals and parties
may contribute to campaigns and, perhaps
more significantly, on how much candidates
may spend on their campaigns.
The measure was enacted as a direct
challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, the 30-year-
old Supreme Court ruling that has generally
been read to permit limits on campaign
contributions, for the purpose of stopping
corruption or apparent corruption-and to bar
limits on candidates' spending as a violation
of free speech.
A ruling in Vermont's favor would have
opened the door to state and federal
restrictions on spending by candidates. But,
in a 6 to 3 vote, the justices opted to reject
the state's law.
Although the court said the government
retains the power to restrict contributions,
for the first time it declared specific limits to
be too low-perhaps opening the way to
challenges on some long-standing
restrictions, such as the 30-year-old $5,000
contribution
committees.
limit for political action
"This is a setback for reformers who were
hoping to expand what the government
could regulate," said Jan W. Baran, a former
counsel for the Republican National
Committee. "This is the first time the
Supreme Court has struck down a
contribution limit-on the grounds that it was
too low."
But Fred Wertheimer, president of
Democracy 21, an organization that lobbies
for campaign finance laws, cautioned
against interpreting the ruling as a green
light for opponents of contribution limits to
challenge existing rules as too restrictive.
The court "has not disturbed the
constitutional doctrine under which we've
been winning cases for years," Wertheimer
said. "It's a status quo opinion. It preserves
the decision upholding the constitutionality
of the soft money ban, and of prohibitions
on corporate and labor union contributions
and expenditures, among others."
Predicting the case's impact is difficult
because the court produced no majority
opinion yesterday, but instead split three
ways.
The court's two newest members, Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr., joined Justice Stephen
517
G. Breyer in ruling that, under Buckley, any
limits on the amount candidates may spend
on their campaigns violate freedom of
speech. The three justices also ruled that
although contribution limits are permissible,
Vermont's were so low that they skewed
political competition.
Because it was the narrowest reasoning in
the majority, Breyer's opinion controls the
case.
Yet it also had the appearance of damage
control by Breyer, who has generally
favored campaign finance regulation. The
justices in the Breyer-led trio were the only
members of the court to agree on his
interpretation of Buckley.
The other three votes against Vermont came
from justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas. They opposed
the Vermont law on broad free-speech
reasoning that would have scrapped or
changed Buckley's limits on campaign
contributions.
Vermont could muster support only from
dissenters John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and David H. Souter in favor of its
reading of Buckley, which would have
permitted spending limits under some
circumstances.
The result appears to doom any future
efforts to impose spending limits on state or
federal campaigns, legal analysts said.
The Vermont law at issue in yesterday's
ruling was enacted by the state legislature
and signed into law by then-Gov. Howard
Dean (D) in 1997.
The statute was written by advocates of
tougher campaign laws who knew that its
limits on spending, which ranged from
$2,500 for state House candidates to
$300,000 for gubernatorial candidates, ran
counter to Buckley. But they wanted to
generate a case that would force the
Supreme Court to revisit and reinterpret the
precedent.
Emphasizing society's "reliance on settled
precedent," Breyer rejected Vermont's plea.
He noted that it "amounts to no more than an
invitation so to limit Buckley's holding as to
effectively overrule it."
Breyer wrote that Vermont's rationale for
spending limits-to cut back on the time
candidates must spend raising cash-was not
new, as the state had argued, but had already
been factored into the court's ruling in
Buckley.
Breyer moved on to the contribution limits
for individuals and parties, which range
from $200 per two-year election cycle-
primary and general elections included-for
state House candidates, to $400 for
statewide candidates.
Reading a summary of his opinion in court
yesterday, Breyer said the $200-per-election
limit on contributions for statewide races is
"way, way, way lower" than the $1,000
federal limit approved in Buckley-95 percent
lower, adjusted for inflation. As such, he
said, it endangers the ability of some
candidates, especially challengers, to get
their message out.
In his written opinion, he noted four
additional problems: that the limits are not
adjusted to inflation; that they also apply to
political parties, harming their right to
association; that the level of political
corruption in Vermont did not seem
unusually serious; and that the law would
force volunteers to count their expenses as
campaign contributions.
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A volunteer who "offers a campaign the use
of her house along with coffee and
doughnuts for a few dozen neighbors to
meet the candidate, say, two or three times
during the campaign" might run afoul of the
law, Breyer wrote.
In a concurring opinion joined by Scalia,
Thomas argued that Breyer's opinion
provided no "workable inquiry to be
performed by States attempting to comply
with this Court's jurisprudence." He repeated
his previous call to scrap Buckley. In a
separate opinion, Kennedy said the post-
Buckley "new order" "may cause more
problems than it solves," but stopped short
of calling for the decision's overruling.
In dissent, Souter, joined by Stevens and
Ginsburg, agreed with Vermont that its
contribution limits were constitutional,
saying they "are not remarkable departures
either from those previously upheld by this
Court or from those lately adopted by other
States."
Souter and Ginsburg also would have
interpreted Buckley to allow the state to
defend its limits in court, based on what
Souter called "the impact of the money
chase on the democratic process."
Stevens, who was on the court in 1976 but
did not vote in Buckley, went further, saying
he had concluded that "the time has come to
overrule" Buckley's spending limits. He
wrote that "a candidate need not flood the
airways with ceaseless sound-bites of trivial
information in order to provide voters with
reasons to support her."
Staff writer Jeffrey H. Birnbaum contributed
to this report.
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"Vermont Campaign Limits Get Cool Reception at Court"
The New York Times
March 1, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court displayed little appetite
on Tuesday for making basic changes in its
approach to campaign finance law, under
which the government may place limits on
political contributions but not on a
candidate's spending.
Vermont's aggressive effort to drive much
private money out of politics, through a law
it enacted in 1997 that set tight limits on
both contributions and expenditures,
appeared unlikely to withstand the court's
scrutiny after an argument that included a
low-key but withering cross-examination by
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. of
Vermont's attorney general, William H.
Sorrell.
The chief justice challenged the attorney
general's assertion that money was a
corrupting influence on Vermont's political
system, the state's main rationale for its law.
"How many prosecutions for political
corruption have you brought?" he asked the
state official.
"Not any," Mr. Sorrell replied.
"Do you think corruption in Vermont is a
serious problem?"
"It is," the attorney general replied, noting
that polls showed that most state residents
thought corporations and wealthy
individuals exerted an undue influence in the
state.
The chief justice persisted. "Would you
describe your state as clean or corrupt?" he
asked.
"We have got a problem in Vermont," Mr.
Sorrell repeated.
The chief justice pressed further. If voters
think "someone has been bought," he said, "I
assume they act accordingly" at the next
election and throw the incumbent out.
He also challenged a line from the attorney
general's 50-page brief, an assertion that
donations from special-interest groups "often
determine what positions candidates and
officials take on issues." Could the attorney
general provide an example of such an issue,
Chief Justice Roberts asked. Mr. Sorrell
could not, eventually conceding that
"influence" would have been a better word
than "determine."
By the end of the argument, it appeared clear
that Vermont's spending limits would fall,
and that its contribution limits, the lowest in
the country, were hanging by a thread.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer said he was
concerned that the limits, $400 over a two-
year election cycle to candidates for
statewide office down to $200 for the state's
House, were so low as to "give incumbents a
tremendous advantage" and "really shut off
the possibility of a challenge" by a candidate
who had to raise and spend more money to
make an impact. Political parties face the
same limits on contributions to their own
candidates.
On the expenditure side, the limits go from
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$300,000 over a two-year cycle for a
governor's race down to $2,000 for a seat in
the House. The law makes no adjustments
for candidates who have to run in a primary
in addition to the general election.
Incumbents are held to 85 percent or 90
percent of what a challenger may spend,
depending on the office.
"I'd like to know why the limits are not far
too low," Justice Breyer said to Mr. Sorrell.
The attorney general replied that the law's
limits were sufficient, with rare exceptions,
to cover the unusually low cost of
campaigning in Vermont, where three 30-
second spots on a Burlington cable
television station can be bought for $45.
Legislative districts have only 4,000
residents and much campaigning is door-to-
door, he said.
"You're going to have outliers" for whom the
rules may be a problem, Mr. Sorrell said,
"but we have a core constitutional interest in
trying to increase the integrity of our
campaigns."
Six years ago, the court upheld Missouri's
contribution limit of $1,075 against the
argument that it did not permit candidates to
raise enough money to run effective
campaigns. Justice Breyer voted with the
majority but said that the question was close
and that any lower limit might be too
protective of incumbents.
A second lawyer, Brenda Wright, also
argued in defense of the law, representing a
coalition of Vermont residents and
organizations. Lack of proof of the
corrupting role of money should not be held
against the law, Ms. Wright said, because
serious incidents of money buying "undue
influence" typically do not ever become
public.
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. asked Ms.
Wright whether candidates could run
effective campaigns with the contribution
limits in place, but without expenditure
limits. Yes, she replied. That is, in fact, the
system that exists in Vermont today, under
lower courts' rulings in this case, Randall v.
Sorrell, No. 04-1528.
The Federal District Court in Burlington
upheld the contribution limits but struck
down the spending limits under the Supreme
Court's leading precedent on the subject,
Buckley v. Valeo, from 1976. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which sits in New York and covers
Vermont, affirmed on the contribution
limits. Its approach to the spending limits
was more complex.
The appeals court panel held by a 2-to-1
vote that the Buckley precedent was not a
complete bar to Vermont's ability to defend
its spending limits. The state had
demonstrated a "compelling state interest" in
using the limits to combat corruption as well
as to relieve officeholders of the burden of
continual fund-raising, the appeals court
said. But rather than let the spending limits
take effect, it then sent the case back to the
district court to see whether alternatives, like
public financing, might achieve the same
result without coming so close to the
constitutional line.
James Bopp Jr., arguing for the challengers
to the law, a coalition that includes the
Vermont Right-to-Life Committee, the
Vermont Republican Party and the
American Civil Liberties Union, said the
appeals court's ruling on the spending limits
was incorrect as a matter of law. There was
no point in permitting the case to go back to
the district court, Mr. Bopp said.
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Asked by several justices whether any set of
circumstances could justify spending limits,
Mr. Bopp said that while he would not rule
out a justification as a theoretical matter, he
could not think of one that would pass
constitutional muster. He said the First
Amendment demanded that candidates "be
allowed freely to express themselves."
Mr. Bopp said that "a general cynicism
about politics and government has existed
since the first colonists." That was what led
to the American system of checks and
balances, he added. But he said the
definition of corruption invoked to justify
the Vermont law was far too broad.
"As long as Vermont has periodic elections,
incumbents will look to the next election"
and to some extent tailor their behavior
accordingly, he said, adding that "if that's a
definition of corruption, it's sufficient to
abolish elections generally."
Mr. Bopp said the Vermont limits were too
low to permit meaningful campaigns,
amounting to "an unprecedented restriction
on speech."
Among his allies on the court was Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy. In past opinions, he
has expressed serious doubts about limits
about both spending and contributions,
suggesting reliance on public disclosure
instead.
"Let's assume that some members of the
court simply accept the proposition that
money buys access," Justice Kennedy said to
Mr. Bopp. "It's a common-sense conclusion.
I tend to think that money does buy access.
But what follows from that?"
He then answered his own question. "Isn't
the answer that voters can see what's going
on and throw the incumbents out?"
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"Some Initial Thoughts on the Vermont Campaign Finance Decision"
SCOTUSblog
June 26, 2006
Rick Hasen
Rick Hasen has these thoughts (which are
cross posted at Election Law) on today's
decision:
The decision in Randall v. Sorrell today is a
monumental one, because it marks the first
time that the two new Justices have
considered a campaign finance case. Though
the decision is a defeat for Vermont and for
those who supported Vermont's campaign
finance laws, this is about the best decision
that (realistic) supporters of campaign
finance regulation could have hoped for
from the new Roberts Court. The language
about the rights of political parties may also
turn out to be very important, suggesting
laws regulating campaign financing must
give them a special role in fundraising. In
sum, this is something of a split decision for
those who support and oppose campaign
finance regulation.
I would say these are the headlines of the
opinion in a nutshell:
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
agree that some campaign contribution
limits are consistent with the First
Amendment. This was a huge question for
those of us in the field. Justice Breyer wrote
a plurality decision joined by these two
Justices, which, on the question of
contribution limits, distinguishes rather than
overrules recent cases such as McConnell
and Shrink Missouri upholding campaign
contribution limits. Now it might be that
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will
evolve toward the Scalia-Thomas-Kennedy
position that all (or most, in the case of
Kennedy) contribution limits violate the
First Amendment. But for now, you have
these three Justices, along with dissenting
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, who
believe that a great many of the country's
campaign contribution laws are
constitutional. This is a very big deal and
good news for those of us who support such
limits. Justice Kennedy would have struck
the limits down as well, though one senses
that if he wrote the majority opinion, it
would have called into question many more
state and local (not to mention federal)
campaign contribution laws.
Battles will rage across the country over
the constitutionality of particular
contribution limit laws. Justice Breyer has
set out a two part test to judge when a
campaign contribution limit is too low, and
in typical Supreme Court fashion, the second
part of the test has five parts. This plurality
opinion (because it is narrower than the
position taken by the three dissenters) will
set out the controlling test. Under the first
part of the test, courts will look for "danger
signs" that a contribution limit is so low as
to stifle electoral competition. If the limit is
too low, there are five factors that led the
plurality to conclude the Vermont limits
were too low:
a. The contribution limits appear to
significantly restrict the amount of money
available to challengers to run competitive
elections.
b. The same low limits are imposed on
political parties, harming the right to
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association.
c. The law treats volunteer expenses too
harshly, In the context of very low
contribution limits, this imposes too high a
First Amendment cost.
d. The limits are not adjusted for inflation.
e. The record does not show a particular
danger of corruption to justify such stringent
limits on constitutional rights.
The dissenters would have upheld the
contribution limits, seeing them as not much
different than the ones upheld in Shrink
Missouri.
In lower courts, the question will be whether
the contribution limits are too much like
Vermont's to be constitutional.
3. Political parties may now start arguing
for additional constitutional protections
under the third factor listed above. Cases
such as McConnell and Colorado
Republican II rejected the argument that
political parties should have special First
Amendment rights because of how they
facilitate association. This case may revive
that line of authority, and that could turn out
to be quite significant in the long run.
4. The nail in the coffin for expenditure
limits. From the moment I heard that the
supporters of the law (who won in the
Second Circuit) were supporting the cert.
petition, I knew it was a mistake (and said so
many times on the blog). The Court was
poised to move away from its deferential
position in the campaign finance cases, and
there was no need to hasten it. In any case,
part of the mission of some of the plaintiffs'
lawyers had been to get the Court to accept
expenditure limits. What we got instead is a
firm majority on the Court rejecting the idea
that expenditure limits are constitutional,
even under the "time preservation rationale,"
though there's enough room in the opinions
for someone to raise the argument again one
day, through a more frontal attack on
Buckley and enough argumentation to satisfy
Justice Alito (see his concurring opinion)
that the issue was fairly raised.
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"There's No Future in the Past of Campaign Finance"
National Review
June 28, 2006
Ronald D. Rotunda
The Supreme Court's greatest opinions-the
ones that live for years and speak eternal
truths-are pithy. John Marshall's opinion
in Marbury v. Madison (1803) was 26 pages
in the U.S. Reporter system. Brown v. Board
of Education (1954) was only 13 pages.
In contrast, the longer the opinions, the less
likely they will live a long life: the opinions
in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) total 294 pages.
That case recognized that the First
Amendment protects campaign financing
because money talks; if a candidate is
allowed to speak, but the government can
restrict him from raising and spending
money to rent a large hall and megaphones,
then no one can hear what he has to say. The
Court also recognized the incestuous danger
presented when campaigning becomes a
regulated industry, because the incumbent
politicians will be regulating the challengers
who oppose them.
Buckley upheld many (but not all)
regulations of campaign financing after
drawing a distinction of constitutional
magnitude between restrictions on
expenditures (which "impose direct and
substantial restraints on the quality of
political speech" and thus merit more
constitutional protection) and on
contributions ("only a marginal restriction
on the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication"). This distinction, the
complexities it created, and the rationales it
generated account for the length of the
opinion.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
(2003) upheld almost all of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, in opinions
that totaled nearly 300 pages. The case was a
loss for groups like the ACLU, the AFL-
CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce, which
filed briefs opposing the restrictions on
grounds of free speech. (Newspapers
routinely report that only "conservatives"
oppose these restrictions; they must not read
who signs the briefs.) And it was a
tremendous victory for those who support
government regulation.
That victory did not last long. Randall v.
Sorrell (2006) is the latest campaign finance
decision in a long line of long opinions-
nearly 70 pages long, with no majority. The
Court was as fractured as the nose of a
punch-drunk boxer; six justices (using
various rationales) concluded that
Vermont's statute (Act 64) violates free
speech. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts (and by Alito in part) invalidated
Vermont's strict spending and contribution
limits. Alito, in a separate opinion, allowed
that he might overrule Buckley in a different
case. Kennedy concurred in the judgment
given his skepticism regarding the Court's
entire campaign finance caselaw. Thomas,
joined by Scalia, agreed that Act 64 is
unconstitutional and argued that the Court
should overrule Buckley.
Stevens, dissenting, also argued that Buckley
should go, because he believed it protected
free speech too much. He yearned for the
cost-free campaigns represented by the
Lincoln-Douglas debates, but neglected to
mention that in that long-ago time, they
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campaigned for the Senate before there was
a Seventeenth Amendment, when there was
no popular election for U.S. Senators. (Of
the seven debates, none were in Chicago, the
most populous city in Illinois, because the
state legislature appointed the U.S.
Senators.) Souter also dissented, joined by
Ginsburg (and by Stevens in part), and
would have simply upheld the Vermont law.
Act 64 limited campaign expenditures to a
maximum of $300,000 for gubernatorial
candidates and $2,000 for those running for
state representative, indexed for inflation.
Buckley had invalidated a federal limit on
campaign expenditures, arguing that it
violated free speech "by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration and the size of the audience
reached." Randall agreed.
Act 64 also limited political contributions to
$400 to gubernatorial contenders and $200
to state representatives, and limited
contributions by political parties attempting
to aid their candidates. These limits were not
indexed for inflation. Breyer's plurality
concluded that these very low limits made
effective campaigning impossible. "A failure
to index limits means that limits which are
already suspiciously low, will almost
inevitably become too low over time." When
Breyer read a summary of his opinion in
Court, he added, "even if we're wrong,
eventually we would be right," because of
the failure to index for inflation. Only six
years earlier, the Court (in a Souter opinion)
had specifically expressed no concern that
contribution limits were not inflation-
adjusted.
It had been a decade since the Court
invalidated a campaign finance law (where
the Court, also with no majority opinion,
struck a Colorado law that forbade
uncoordinated expenditures by a political
party). And Randall marks the first time the
Court has ever invalidated a limitation on
individual or party contributions to a
candidate.
What will the future bring? Longer opinions,
if the Court tries to keep the complex
distinctions of the prior cases.
There are hints, however, that the Court may
not do that. Breyer's plurality (joined by
Roberts and Alito) advised that the appellate
courts should review the record
"independently," and not defer to the lower
courts to make sure that the restrictions on
campaign financing are "narrowly tailored."
So perhaps hope is warranted for a shorter
decision in the future, one that remedies the
confusion created by the Court's past
decisions on campaign finance.
Ronald D. Rotunda teaches law at George
Mason University
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"Supreme Court Ruling Could Spur Partisan Judicial Campaigns
Justices void restrictions on Minnesota judges' soliciting of money and declaring party
ties."
The Los Angeles Times
January 24, 2006
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court took another step
Monday toward transforming state elections
for judges from nonpartisan, low-key affairs
into big-money contests.
The justices let stand a lower court ruling in
a Minnesota case that voids rules forbidding
judicial candidates from personally
soliciting money or from identifying
themselves as Republicans or Democrats.
The rules were voided using the rationale
that they deprive candidates of free speech.
About 30 states with similar provisions
could be affected if the ruling spreads
beyond the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Monday's decision "could open the
floodgates of money into America's
courtrooms," said the Washington-based
group Justice at Stake. It will "ratchet up
special-interest pressure on courts that are
supposed to be fair and impartial."
Minnesota sought to preserve the rules
against such spending, contending they are
"critical to ensuring that the state's judiciary
is-and is seen to be-above party politics and
the corrupting influences of money."
Thirty states are set to elect justices to their
supreme courts this year. The court ruling
comes against a backdrop of increased
spending for judicial races by 45% between
2002 and 2004.
The Supreme Court decision will not
necessarily have any immediate
consequences in California, said Richard L.
Hasen, an election law expert at Loyola Law
School.
He said the decision, which left in place a
ruling by the 8th Circuit, is not binding on
the 9th Circuit, which handles appeals from
California and eight other western states.
California's Supreme Court justices are
appointed by the governor for set terms, but
must run to retain their seats. Judges of the
state's superior courts are elected in
nonpartisan races. Some legal experts said
Monday's action by the high court suggested
judges and judicial candidates were now free
to run partisan campaigns.
"The implication for California is that the
trial court judges could run as a Democrat or
as a Republican. Before, they could be
disciplined for doing that," said Georgetown
University law professor Roy A. Schotland,
who had urged the Supreme Court to
preserve the current rules for judges.
Hasen said there was nothing in the Supreme
Court decision that would require California
to elect judges through a partisan election.
But he said it was possible that a candidate
might run a partisan campaign with the hope
that the existing state law eventually would
be overturned.
The high court triggered the move toward
more expensive and partisan state judicial
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races four years ago, in Minnesota. It struck
down the state's code of conduct that barred
judges and judicial candidates from
announcing their views on issues that might
come before the courts.
In a 5-4 ruling, the justices said the 1st
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech gave judges a right to speak out on
controversies, even if their pronouncements
might undercut their appearance of
impartiality.
Since then, a series of other rules that restrict
judicial candidates have been challenged in
the lower courts, and nearly all of them have
been struck down on free-speech grounds.
"This means we are moving toward no-
holds-barred elections for judges. It also
means the public will view judges like other
pols and probably have less respect for
courts," said Schotland.
James Bopp Jr., who successfully challenged
the rules on behalf of the Republican Party
of Minnesota, agreed the high court's action
would probably have a wide impact.
"It's becoming clear the 1st Amendment has
a broad application to judicial elections and
that the original foundation for the
regulation of judicial elections has been
pretty well destroyed," he said.
Federal judges, including justices of
Supreme Court, are appointed by
president and confirmed by the Senate
life terms on the bench.
from seeking a party's endorsement.
In August, the full U.S. 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals declared unconstitutional
Minnesota's rules forbidding judges from
engaging in partisan activity and from
personally seeking campaign funds.
The state appealed to the high court.
Minnesota was supported by the American
Bar Assn., the Conference of (state) Chief
Justices and 39 of the nation's largest
corporations. They included Dow Chemical,
General Electric, General Motors, Johnson
& Johnson, Time Warner and Wal-Mart.
These companies voiced concern at "the
prospect of increasingly costly, divisive and
partisan judicial elections." Its officials also
said they "often find themselves between a
rock and a hard place" when a judge asks for
campaign money. Giving "to even the most
promising candidate has the potential to
create an appearance of seeking favor in any
future litigation," the company lawyers said.
"That potential is only compounded when
the judge himself makes the request."
Unswayed, the Supreme Court, without
comment, turned down the appeal Monday
in the case of Dimick vs. Republican Party
of Minnesota, leaving the lower court's
decision intact.
In another election-related case, the justices
said political activists may be able to air
some broadcast ads that mention federal
candidates, despite the McCain-Feingold
Act and its ban on corporate-funded attack
ads within 60 days of an election.
Two years ago, the Supreme Court upheld
this law and said its limited ban on pre-
election broadcast ads did not, in principle,
violate the 1st Amendment. But that
the
the
for
Though most other judges are elected, nearly
all the states enforce judicial codes of
conduct that limit the partisan political
activity of sitting judges. Minnesota forbids
its judges and judicial candidates from
speaking at a political party's meeting or
528
decision did not necessarily forbid specific
challenges, the justices said in a brief 9-0
ruling on Monday.
Times staff writers Henry Weinstein and Jill
Leovy contributed to this report.
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CAMPAIGN-TIME BROADCASTS
"Advocacy Groups Can Challenge Limit on 'Issue Ads'"
USA Today
January 24, 2006
Joan Biskupic
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously
Monday that a Wisconsin anti-abortion
group may go to court to challenge a federal
ban on issue-oriented ads that mention a
particular candidate in the weeks before an
election. The group says the ban infringes on
its First Amendment right to free speech.
The advertising ban, part of a 2002 overhaul
of federal campaign-finance law, was
intended to ensure that wealthy interests
such as corporations and labor unions do not
have undue influence on federal elections.
But Wisconsin Right to Life, backed by an
unusual coalition of conservative and liberal
groups, argued that the ban sometimes
infringes on legitimate grass-roots lobbying.
The Wisconsin group was appealing a
decision by a lower court that threw out the
group's claim that the "issue ad" blackout
violated its speech rights.
On Monday, the justices spurned the Justice
Department, which argued that allowing
individual challenges to the ban on certain
ads would force federal judges to assess the
political intentions of campaign ads and
could lead to disruptive lawsuits just before
elections.
Under the federal law, corporations and
unions may not use their general funds to
broadcast issue ads that refer to a candidate
for federal office within 30 days of a
primary or 60 days of a general election. The
ban is part of the 2002 campaign overhaul
known as the McCain-Feingold law, after its
Senate sponsors John McCain,
Russ Feingold, D-Wis. In
Supreme Court said the
constitutional.
R-Ariz., and
2003, the
law was
Wisconsin Right to Life sued the Federal
Election Commission the following year,
contending that the ban on issue-oriented
ads interfered with its plans to air a spot that
criticized Democratic-sponsored Senate
filibusters of judicial candidates. The group's
ad identified Feingold, then running for re-
election, by name. The group argued that it
was trying to generate public pressure on
Feingold not to support filibusters of the
Bush administration's judicial nominees.
However, a three-judge appeals panel in
Washington, D.C., suggested the anti-
filibuster message linked to Feingold was
the kind of ad that Congress wanted to bar in
the weeks just before elections. The panel
noted that the anti-abortion group, in earlier
ads, had made clear that it opposed
Feingold. But the panel did not rule on the
merits of Wisconsin Right to Life's claim
that the ad ban violated its speech rights.
Rather, it said the Supreme Court's 2003
ruling barred such specific constitutional
challenges to the ban.
In reversing the lower court, the justices said
that although they had upheld the provision
in question, "we did not purport to resolve
future . .. challenges" to it.
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Chief Justice John Roberts read parts of the
three-page opinion from the bench and noted
the decision was unanimous. The case now
goes back to the appeals court, which will
consider the merits of the Wisconsin group's
claim.
"The lower court must now confront the real
merits of this case . . . that there is no
constitutional justification for prohibiting
grass-roots lobbying about upcoming votes
in Congress, just because we are in an
election season," said lawyer James Bopp,
who represented the Wisconsin group.
Nan Aron, of the liberal Alliance for Justice,
also praised the ruling. "Prohibiting ads on
important legislative matters facing
Congress, regardless of the election
calendar, violates the First Amendment
rights of non-profit organizations."
The Justice Department had no comment.
"The battle goes on," said Fred Wertheimer,
president of Democracy 21, a group that
backed the ad ban. "There's a very powerful
case to establish that these ads were about
defeating Sen. Feingold, not lobbying him."
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"Electioneering Blackout Upheld"
SCOTUSblog
May 9, 2006
Lyle Denniston
This is another in a continuing series of
reports on the aftermath of Supreme Court
decisions or orders. The Court in 2003
upheld against a facial attack the provisions
of the 2002 federal election finance law that
bar corporations and labor unions from
using their own funds to pay for a broadcast,
cable or satellite message that mentions a
federal candidate 30 days before a primary
election and 60 days before a general
election (McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission). However, on January 23, in
Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (docket 04-
1581), the Court ruled summarily that "as-
applied" challenges could be made to
enforcement of the electioneering blackout.
The following is a District Court's reaction
to that ruling, in another case.
A three-judge U.S. District Court in
Washington on Tuesday ruled that the FEC
may forbid a Maine group that opposes
same-sex marriage from running ads,
planned to start on Wednesday, urging that
state's voters to write to their two U.S.
Senators to urge them to support a federal
constitutional amendment outlawing such
marriages nationwide. One of the two
Senators, Olympia Snowe, a Republican, is
running in the primary election in Maine set
for June 13-thus, the planned ad campaign
would be running during the 30-day
blackout period that federal law imposes.
The Maine group is Christian Civic League
of Maine, Inc. It has planned to spend about
$4,000 on a radio advertisement naming
Sen. Snowe and her GOP colleague, Sen.
Susan Collins. The group said it expects the
Senate to be debating and voting on the
proposed constitutional amendment early in
June, so it wanted the campaign to unfold at
a time that could generate voter pressure on
the Senators.
(The Wisconsin Right to Life case, which
involved a 2004 ad campaign that named
Sen. Russ Feingold, Democrat, has returned
to U.S. District Court in Washington [docket
04-1260]. A hearing on it, before a different
panel of three judges, is now scheduled for
September 18. Thus, the Maine case moved
on a faster track.)
At this stage, the case of Christian Civil
League of Maine v. FEC (docket 06-614),
only involved a request by the League for a
preliminary injunction to bar the FEC from
enforcing the electioneering blackout during
the planned pre-primary period. The group
had asked for a broader injunction, against
any enforcement against any ad campaign
involving "grass roots lobbying," but the
District Court confined its ruling to the
specific ad that was to run beginning this
week. (The Court noted that the League
could go ahead with the ad campaign if it
did not use its own treasury funds to pay for
it, but the League has opted not to do so, in
order to test the constitutionality of any
enforcement against a "grass roots lobbying"
broadcast.)
In its ruling, which can be found here, the
District Court said that "enforcement of the
electioneering communications provision to
bar the League's proposed advertisement
appears problematic under the First
Amendment." It noted that the First
Amendment protects corporate speech on
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matters of public concern, and that the
planned ad "would address a legislative
issue at a time when that issue is likely to be
under consideration in the Senate. And the
advertisement does not mention Sen.
Snowe's candidacy, which is unopposed."
But, the Court went on, the blackout
provision "appears narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest...
Particularly after McConnell, there can be no
question that the government interest in
maintaining the integrity of the electoral
process is compelling." It again noted that
the League could run the campaign with
money other than from its own treasury.
"Here, the Act does not bar the proposed
advertisement; it only requires that the
League fund it through a political action
committee," the Court declared. And it could
even use its own money if it put the ad in
something other than broadcast format, such
as in a newspaper, a leaflet, an e-mail, or a
telephone bank message. Further, it said, the
ad could even be financed out of corporate
funds, so long as it did not clearly identify
Sen. Snowe.
The Court said that the planned ad "appears
to be functionally equivalent to the sham
issue advertisements identified in
McConnell." The ad, it noted, calls Snowe's
prior vote against the marriage amendment
"unfortunate," and thus "is the sort of veiled
attack that the Supreme Court has warned
may improperly influence an election." The
Court speculated that the ad might
encourage a new candidate to run against
Snowe, reducing her primary votes,
weakening her for the general election, "or
otherwise undermining her efforts to gather
such support, including by raising funds for
her reelection."
A "grass roots lobbying" exception to the
blackout provision, it said, "would seriously
impair the government's compelling interest
in protecting the integrity of the electoral
process."
It concluded that the League had not shown
"a substantial likelihood" that its First
Amendment challenge to enforcement
would succeed when the case proceeds to
the merits.
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"Court Refuses To Speed Election Case"
SCOTUSblog
May 15, 2006
Lyle Denniston
UPDATE: The Supreme Court on Monday
afternoon denied a request from a Maine
group to speed up the Justices' consideration
of a constitutional challenge to federal limits
on broadcast of a message opposing same-
sex marriage during the month prior to
Maine's primary election for a U.S. Senate
seat on June 13. The Court's order reads:
"The motion of appellant to expedite
consideration of the appeal and to
consolidate briefing is denied." 0
As a result, the Federal Election
Commission's response to the appeal is due
June 12. Monday's order, plus the Court's
likely conclusion of its current Term near
the end of June, very likely means that the
case will go over to the new Term starting
Oct. 2. By then, it could be moot, or there
could be a new appeal later, after further
proceedings in U.S. District Court. The
Maine group involved has said it plans to
run similar broadcast messages during the
general election campaign this Fall. (The
following is an earlier post on the case.)
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement on
Monday opposed expedited review of a new
appeal challenging the constitutionality of
federal limits on broadcasts of so-called
"grass roots lobbying" in the pre-election
season. The opposition urged the Court to let
the case of Christian Civic League of Maine
v. Federal Election Commission (05-1447)
play out on the usual schedule, meaning it
probably would not come up for review until
the new Term starting Oct. 2.
Also joining in opposing the speedy review
of the case were two U.S. senators and three
members of the House of Representatives,
proponents of campaign finance laws who
have been in the case in lower courts as
intervenors. They argued that "nothing in
this case justifies" the "extraordinary action"
of swift review and a decision.
Attorneys for the Maine organization had
asked the Court to put their appeal on a fast
track, with only one round of briefs, and
with a prompt hearing. The request included
a plea for the FEC to file its response on the
merits by Wednesday of this week.
The Solicitor General's response argued that
the group would be free to broadcast its
Maine message targeting same-sex marriage
after the Senate primary election in that state
on June 13. So, it said, the District Court's
denial of a preliminary injunction "is likely
to become moot" before the Court could rule
on the merits, unless there was unusual
expedition of Court review.
"The Court," Clement argued, "has no
obligation to reorder its calendar and issue a
decision in this case under the
extraordinarily expedited schedule proposed
by CCLM simply to ensure that the appeal
of an interlocutory order in the case is
decided while a live controversy remains
with respect to the validity of the district
court's preliminary injunction.. . . No statute
requires the Court to expedite its
consideration of the interlocutory appeal in
this case."
Thus, Clement said, the Court should deny
the motion to expedite and consolidate
briefing "and permit the FEC to respond to
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CCLM's jurisdictional statement in the
ordinary course." Any ruling on as-applied
challenges to the federal law's restriction on
"electioneering communications" would be
likely to spell out general standards for such
challenges, he added, and the parties if
pushed to act rapidly would be likely to brief
those issues in truncated form. The Court
would have only a narrow window of time-
less than three weeks-to hear oral argument
and issue a decision "during what is
otherwise one of the busiest times of the
Court's year," he said.
In addition, the Solicitor General said that,
even if expedition is denied, the Maine
group may still ask the District Court to
provide relief after further facts are
developed. Thus, he argued, "this Court
should await a case in which the record
concerning the communications at issue has
been fully developed, and the Court is able
to engage in its customary decisionmaking
process rather than the truncated procedure
proposed by CCLM." The choice, he said,
"is not between now and never, but between
orderly review in due course or rushed
proceedings at an interlocutory stage."
The government filing suggested that the
particular advertisement in question,
promoting a federal constitutional
amendment against same-sex marriage and
specifically mentioning Sen. Olympia
Snowe, a Republican seeking reelection and
appearing in the state's June 13 primary, was
"designed so as to create a test case" by
triggering the federal law's ban on corporate
financing of such communications. It notes
that the Maine league agreed to put on the ad
after the message was composed by a related
group, Focus on the Family, and after Focus
on the Family had sent out e-mails to the
League and other organizations to recruit
them to mount legal action.
The five members of Congress who joined
in opposing fast-track review also related for
the Court the story of how the ad in question
had been the result of an attempt to create a
test case, "thus undercutting any claim of
significant injury." The lawmakers said that
the Focus on the Family e-mail to various
organizations had included an attachment
from a lawyer, offering to pursue the case
"at no charge" and anticipating an appeal to
the Supreme Court, resulting in "a landmark
ruling."
Later Monday, the League filed its reply,
accusing the FEC and the lawmakers of
engaging in manipulation of the federal
courts and scuttling any litigation over the
communications blackout provision to
"grass roots lobbying" broadcasts. The other
side, it said, wants the case to be allowed to
become moot and then allow it to proceed
further in District Court. Calling the tactic
"bait and switch," the League said that, "if
tolerated," it "would put citizen groups in an
endless loop of being mooted but never ripe
in their efforts to obtain this Court's
constitutional judgment on this important
public issue."
With that reply in hand, the Court is
expected to respond promptly to the
question of expediting the case.
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VOTING RIGHTS
"Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Extension
President vows to build on "legal equality" won in Civil Rights Era."
The Washington Post
July 28, 2006
Hamil R. Harris and Michael Abramwitz
Joined by stalwarts of the civil rights
movement, President Bush yesterday signed
into law a 25-year extension of the Voting
Rights Act, the historic legislation that
opened the ballot box to millions of blacks
across the South in the 1960s.
Under the legislation, the Justice
Department will maintain the authority to
review changes in ballot procedures,
legislative districts and other electoral rules
in several states, mainly in the South, to
ensure that African Americans and other
minorities maintain influence in elections.
"By reauthorizing this act, Congress has
reaffirmed its belief that all men are created
equal," Bush said as he looked into a crowd
of people waving church fans bearing the
image of the American flag. He vowed "to
continue to build on the legal equality won
by the civil rights movement to help ensure
that every person enjoys the opportunity that
this great land of liberty offers."
GOP leaders have been eager to renew the
act before the fall elections, but the measure
had faced trouble in the House over concern
from some Republicans that it unfairly
targeted certain Southern states. But House
leaders managed to defeat amendments they
regarded as politically embarrassing, and the
Senate passed the measure last week with
little debate.
Bush signed the bill with considerable
fanfare on the White House's South Lawn,
joined by civil rights leaders who often have
been at odds with his administration. They
included NAACP Board Chairman Julian
Bond, Jesse L. Jackson and Al Sharpton.
Also present were family members of three
prominent civil rights figures whose names
are attached to the legislation: Rosa Parks,
Coretta Scott King and Fannie Lou Hamer,
who was beaten and jailed in 1962 trying to
register to vote in Mississippi.
Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) called the
ceremony historic because of those who
attended. "It is enormously impressive to see
George Bush and Julian Bond exchange
salutes. It is a great day for America," he
said. Congressional Black Caucus Chairman
Melvin Watt (D-N.C.) said that even though
Bush signed the Voting Rights bill, the
relationship between Bush and black
America has not changed. "He is the same
George Bush; on some issues we work
together, and on most issues we are not able
to work together," he said.
Also present at the ceremony was Rep.
William J. Jefferson (D-La.), who is under
federal investigation in a corruption case.
Jefferson said he felt compelled to come to
the White House because, he said, "I grew
up in a time when my mother couldn't vote.
This is real big step for many of us."
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"Voting Rights Act Extension Passes In Senate 98 to 0"
The Washington Post
July 21, 2006
Charles Babington
The Senate voted 98 to 0 to renew key
provisions of the Voting Rights Act
yesterday, permitting the federal government
to continue its broad oversight of state
voting procedures for the next quarter-
century, and allowing Republicans to claim
equality with Democrats in protecting
minorities' clout at the ballot box.
The act requires several states, mostly in the
South, to obtain Justice Department
approval before changing precinct
boundaries, polling places, legislative
districts, ballot formats and other voting
procedures. It also requires many
jurisdictions throughout the nation to
provide bilingual ballots or interpreters for
voters whose English is not strong.
Those two provisions caused a mini-revolt
among House Republicans last week. GOP
leaders had to scramble-and rely on heavy
Democratic support-to defeat proposed
amendments that they said would dilute the
bill and prove politically embarrassing.
The law, first passed in 1965, retains near-
iconic status in civil rights circles, even
though some elected officials say it is no
longer needed. GOP leaders were eager to
renew it before the November elections.
Unlike the House, where some Southern
Republicans opposed provisions that focus
on their states, the Senate passed the bill
unanimously after hours of one-sided debate
in which member after member praised
leaders of the 1960s desegregation
movement.
President Bush, addressing the NAACP's
annual convention while the debate was
underway, said he looked forward to signing
the measure. "A generation of Americans
that has grown up in the last few decades
may not appreciate what this act has meant,"
he said. "Condi Rice understands what this
act has meant," Bush said, referring to the
secretary of state, an African American who
grew up in Alabama in the 1950s and '60s.
The disharmony evident during the House's
deliberations on the act barely touched
yesterday's Senate proceedings, in which
lawmakers from both parties and all regions
agreed that the Voting Rights Act remains
pertinent and necessary. Several black
House members-including Rep. John Lewis
(D-Ga.), who worked alongside the Rev.
Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960s-were on
the Senate floor for the vote. Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) shook hands with
Rep. Melvin Watt (D-N.C.), chairman of the
Congressional Black Caucus, when the
result was announced.
"As we reflect on the true wrongs that
existed in the 1950s and 1960s and where
those wrongs may have taken place, we owe
it to history ... to pay tribute to those who
took the law and made it a reality," Sen.
Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.), whose House
colleagues led the opposition in the other
chamber, said during the debate.
Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) was a bit
more grudging. "While I support this bill, I
continue to have some serious concerns with
several aspects of it," including its
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"extension for an extraordinary 25 years," he
said from the floor. The defeated House
amendments, he said, "would have
strengthened this bill and updated it to
reflect the reality of profoundly improved
race relations" in Georgia.
The act, originally signed by President
Lyndon B. Johnson, outlawed practices such
as poll taxes and literacy tests that many
Southern jurisdictions used to depress black
voter turnout. As amended over the years, it
required such jurisdictions to obtain federal
"pre-clearance" for an array of voting-
related practices that might have the effect
of reducing minority voters' influence.
Some local and national officials say the
targeted oversight is no longer justified and
is a relic of days when Southern states could
not be trusted to treat all citizens justly. But
others say abuses still occur. "Where would
the citizens of Georgia be-particularly low-
income and minority citizens-if they were
required to produce a government-issued
identification or pay $20 every five years in
order to vote?" Sen. John F. Kerry (D-
Mass.) asked in reference to measures
approved by the Georgia Legislature but
challenged in federal courts under the
Voting Rights Act.
Civil rights activist Jesse L. Jackson said in
an interview that the Senate vote called for
"restrained celebration," because the Bush
administration's Justice Department has
shown tepid enthusiasm for enforcing the
voting law. "This Justice Department, right
down the line, has chosen states' rights,"
Jackson said.
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.)
called the vote a major success. "The Voting
Rights Act has worked," he said. "We need
to build upon that progress by extending
expiring provisions."
Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) called the act
"the cornerstone of our civil rights laws. We
honor those who fought through the years
for equality by extending the Voting Rights
Act to ensure that their struggles are not
forsaken and not forgotten, and that the
progress we have made not be sacrificed."
Caroline Fredrickson, director of the
ACLU's Washington Legislative Office,
praised the extension of the law's key
provisions and urged vigilant enforcement.
"We must look ahead to make sure the
promise is as true and strong as it was in
1965," she said. "Malicious attempts by
lawmakers to derail reauthorization show the
continuing need for this law and its
enforcement." She urged Bush "to sign this
legislation as soon as possible."
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"More Racial Gerrymanders"
The National Journal
May 13, 2006
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
When conservative Republicans such as
House Speaker Dennis Hastert and Senate
Majority Leader Bill Frist jointly sponsor
Voting Rights Act amendments with such
liberal Democrats as Rep. John Conyers and
Sen. Edward Kennedy, be suspicious.
They are steanrollering through Congress
bipartisan legislation to renew for the next
25 years a much-misunderstood, largely
anachronistic provision (Section 5) of the
Voting Rights Act, including amendments
that are driven by racial-identity politics and
that would aggravate ideological
polarization.
The amendments would turn back the clock
on racial progress by requiring even more
racial gerrymandering of election districts
than under current law. And the extension of
Section 5, as currently drafted, would
perpetuate an extraordinarily punitive
oversight regime that gives to federal
political appointees and not-exactly-
apolitical bureaucrats at the Justice
Department unreviewable power to dictate
state and local election rules in nine (mostly
Southern) states and some other
jurisdictions.
Why would broad bipartisan majorities of
House and Senate incumbents want to do
that? To help themselves win re-election, for
starters. More specifically, Democrats are
pandering to the demands of black and
Hispanic politicians for safe seats and to the
ideological obsessions of the civil-rights
lobby, which still sees America as so
steeped in racism that whites just won't vote
for minority candidates.
Never mind that Douglas Wilder, an
African-American, was elected governor of
Virginia in 1989; Bill Richardson, a
Hispanic, was elected governor of New
Mexico in 2002; Colin Powell might well
have been elected president of the United
States had he run in 1996; nine of the 34
Georgia officials elected statewide are black;
and so on, and so on.
As for the Republicans, they are terrified of
being characterized as racists if they oppose
anything that carries the "voting-rights"
label. Such demagoguing works because
most Americans don't understand that this
legislation is not mainly about the basic right
to cast a meaningful ballot-which is secure-
but about mandating safe seats for
incumbents and other minority politicians.
Second, many Republicans also believe-
perhaps incorrectly-that drawing so-called
"majority-minority" urban districts for black
and Hispanic Democrats will "bleach" the
surrounding suburban districts and thus help
Republicans beat white, moderate
Democrats there. That was the result of the
racial gerrymanders of the 1990s: The
number of (very liberal) black and Hispanic
Democrats in the House went up; the
number of (more moderate) white
Democrats went down-and this helped
Republicans take and keep control of the
House. This was good for black and
Hispanic politicians. It was not so good for
black and Hispanic voters.
But Republicans who think that they will
benefit by renewing their alliance of
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convenience with the civil-rights lobby may
be in for a surprise, as explained below.
In any event, the pending legislation "will
ensure heavily packed minority
congressional districts that stifle
competition, ideologically polarize elections,
and insulate Republican representatives
from minorities and minority representatives
from Republicans," as Edward Blum, a
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,
said in congressional testimony.
Bad as this is for the body politic, writes
Roger Clegg of the Center for Equal
Opportunity, it is good for incumbent
politicians: "Both parties, especially
Republicans, are politically happy with
segregated districts and uncompetitive
contests."
While Blum and Clegg are conservatives,
leading liberal scholars have also raised
concerns about the wisdom and the
constitutionality of major aspects of the
pending legislation to extend and amend
Section 5, and have called for reducing the
Justice Department's power to dictate state
and local voting rules.
"It is far from clear that the injustices that
justified Section 5 in 1965 can justify its
unqualified re-enactment today," said
professor Samuel Issacharoff, a leading
liberal expert on election law at New York
University Law School, in Senate testimony
on May 9. He also noted that federal Section
5 interventions in statewide redistricting
have been "rife with accusations of partisan
motivation." And he questioned whether
''minority voters are well served by being
packed in increasingly concentrated
minority districts."
The Voting Rights Act's permanent
provisions protect against the vestiges of
discrimination in voting that no doubt
remain, especially in scattered localities
where old-fashioned racism remains strong.
Section 2, for example, supports court
challenges to dilution of minority voting
power.
Section 5, on the other hand, was adopted in
1965 as a temporary measure to prevent
evasion by the state and local governments
with the worst histories of suppressing the
black vote. They must obtain Justice
Department "preclearance" of redistricting
plans and of even the smallest change in
voting rules.
But so effective have other Voting Rights
Act provisions been that little evidence
exists that most governments in the nine
covered states are more hostile to minority
voters than are governments that the law
doesn't cover. Indeed, there is little evidence
of systematic discrimination by any state
government, despite a huge research effort
by the civil-rights lobby to find and magnify
such evidence.
Not only are the terms of the proposed re-
enactment unduly strong medicine for what
discrimination in voting rules remains;
enforcement of Section 5 has actually
aggravated racial gerrymandering and has
sometimes been partisan.
The Justice Department earned a rebuke
from the Supreme Court in 1995 for
insisting that Georgia, among other states,
adopt a racial gerrymander of its
congressional districts so extreme as to
violate the Constitution's equal protection
clause. The George H.W. Bush Justice
Department, in its alliance of convenience
with the civil-rights lobby, had pushed for
such racial gerrymanders. But Republicans
should beware what the next Democratic
president's Justice Department might do,
especially with some of the pending
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amendments.
One would overrule a 2003 Supreme Court
decision to bar states from replacing any of
their existing majority-minority districts-
safe seats for black or Hispanic politicians-
with districts that are more racially
integrated. This despite strong evidence that
more-integrated districts would be better
both for minority voters and for attaining
what Rep. John Lewis, D-Ga., a civil-rights
icon, once called the goal of a community
"where we would be able to forget about
race and color, and see people as people, as
human beings, just as citizens."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor quoted
Lewis's words in her majority opinion in the
2003 ruling Georgia v. Ashcroft. She added
that a central purpose of the Voting Rights
Act was "to foster our transformation to a
society that is no longer fixated on race."
Accordingly, she held that a state may, if it
chooses, reduce the number of majority-
minority districts in order to increase overall
minority voting power by creating larger
numbers of more-integrated "influence
districts." Those are districts controlled by
coalitions of minority and white Democrats.
Influence districts also tend to be more
competitive and to choose candidates who
are more moderate than the extreme liberals
who tend to dominate majority-minority
districts and the extreme conservatives who
tend to dominate "bleached" suburban
districts.
But now Congress is poised to require more
segregated districts, and thus to enhance
both our fixation on race and our ideological
polarization. John Lewis-who has sadly let
party loyalty and solidarity with racialist
allies trump his nobler principles-is a co-
Other pending amendments to Section 5
would effectively overrule two other
Supreme Court decisions, in 1997 and 2000,
by allowing Justice Department officials to
veto any change in voting rules that they
subjectively label unfair to minorities, even
if the change leaves minority voters no
worse off than before. This would make it
especially easy for Justice Department
officials to devise pretexts for grinding
partisan taxes.
Which brings us back to why House
Republicans may be in for a surprise if they
hope to reap the same political gains that
they did in the 1990s from helping the civil-
rights lobby create majority-minority
districts.
Once Democrats win the presidency, they
will have the motive, the means, and the
opportunity to stick it to Republicans by
manipulating the Justice Department's
enlarged power over state and local voting
rules in the nine covered states-all of them
red. And Democrats have become more
adept since the 1990s at creating fairly safe
seats for black and Hispanic Democrats
without making the adjacent suburban
districts safe for Republicans.
So by casting aside their supposed color-
blind principles in pursuit of political self-
preservation, among other sins, Republicans
may be paving the way for their own return
to permanent minority status, at least in the
House.
This they richly deserve, for many a reason.
I wish that I could be confident that a
Democratic majority will be better.
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DeLAY BALLOT
"DeLay Must Stay on Ballot as Court Rejects Appeal"
The New York Times
August 8, 2006
Ralph Blumenthal
The United States Supreme Court dealt a
final blow on Monday to efforts by the
Texas Republican Party to replace former
Representative Tom DeLay on the
Congressional ballot in November, leaving
him the reluctant party nominee from his
longtime district.
Three state and federal courts had already
ruled that Mr. DeLay had to remain the
party's choice despite his assertions that he
had moved to Virginia from Texas. In April,
he announced he would give up his re-
election campaign and resign his seat to
allow the party to select another candidate
while he battled legal charges.
On Monday, Republican lawyers filed a
final appeal to the Supreme Court, but it was
rejected hours later without comment by the
circuit justice, Antonin Scalia.
"There's nothing else we're going to do
legally," said James Bopp Jr., the lawyer
who argued the case for the Republicans.
"We've certainly exhausted our appeals."
The court's refusal to intervene handed a
major victory to Democrats, who have
fought to keep Mr. DeLay in the spotlight as
a reminder of the Washington lobbying
scandal involving his associate Jack
Abramoff. It will make it harder for
Republicans to retain Mr. DeLay's old seat
and will allow Democrats to send a wider
message that change is needed on Capitol
Hill.
It is unclear whether Mr. DeLay, 59, the
former House majority leader, who first won
the seat in 1984, will now actively campaign
in an election he has said he does not belong
in. During the appeals, he never said
whether he would run if he remained on the
ballot, and Dani DeLay Ferro, his daughter
and spokeswoman, said after the Supreme
Court decision that he had no immediate
statement.
Mr. Bopp said he did not know whether Mr.
DeLay would actively run for the seat, but
he suggested the outcome might not be as
predetermined as Democrats believe.
"It's now up to the voters to determine if the
Democrats will be happy on Election Day
for choosing Tom DeLay," he said.
Mr. DeLay, who had been criticized
repeatedly by the House Ethics Committee
for his fund-raising tactics, was indicted in
Texas in September on charges of violating
campaign finance law.
The court rulings prevented the Republicans
from choosing a successor out of several
eager contenders. The Democrats, though,
have long had a nominee in the 22nd
District: former Representative Nick
Lampson, who lost his neighboring seat after
the 2003 redistricting engineered by Mr.
DeLay.
In a statement, Mr. Lampson said, "I
welcome a strong issue-based campaign
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against Tom DeLay."
The Texas Democratic Party chairman,
Boyd Richie, applauded the Supreme
Court's refusal to block the lower court
orders preventing the Republican Party
chairwoman, Tina J. Benkiser, from trying
to select another nominee.
"We are not surprised that Justice Scalia has
denied the Republicans' motion to stay,"
Mr. Richie said. "Every judge involved in
the case so far has agreed with us on the
merits of our argument. It is time for Tom
DeLay and the Republican Party to get out
of the courtroom and quit this abuse of the
voters, who have been without
representation for months. Both parties have
candidates, and it is now time to move
forward and allow voters to participate in a
fair and meaningful election."
The legal issue hinged in part on whether
party officials could replace a nominee who
had been selected by the voters. Having
decisively won a hard-fought four-way
primary in March, Mr. DeLay upended
Texas politics by unexpectedly declaring
that he would drop his campaign and resign
his 22-year seat to move to Virginia.
But a Texas judge, a federal judge in Austin
and a three-judge federal appeals panel in
New Orleans blocked the Republican Party
from choosing a replacement under
provisions of Texas election law and the
Constitution that barred tampering with
candidate lists and election standards.
The federal courts ruled that the only
residency requirement for House candidates
under the Constitution was that they lived in
the state they were running in "when
elected." No one could know now whether
Mr. DeLay would be a resident of Texas in
November, the judges said, rejecting claims
by Ms. Benkiser that the party could name a
replacement because Mr. DeLay had shown
documentation of his move to Virginia.
With the clock ticking toward November
and the Republicans and Mr. DeLay saying
he was ineligible to run in Texas, Mr. Bopp,
the lawyer, filed Monday for a Supreme
Court stay, arguing that the Democrats, by
insisting on Mr. DeLay as the nominee, were
infringing on the Republicans' constitutional
right of free association and intruding in
Republican Party affairs.
But the appellate judges had ruled that they
saw the move more as an effort by
Republicans to replace a wounded candidate
in ways unfair to the Democrats, and Justice
Scalia, in turning down the final appeal, said
nothing to indicate that he saw it differently.
Cris Feldman, a lawyer for the Democrats,
said: "Five judges to date have agreed the
Texas Republican Party violated state and
federal law, and it's apparent that Justice
Scalia agrees with us. Now it's time for Tom
DeLay to decide whether he will cut or run."
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"DeLay Ballot Issue Heads For Court"
SCOTUSblog
August 3, 2006
Lyle Denniston
The head of the Texas Republican Party,
seeking to clear a space on the November
election ballot for a new GOP candidate for
the House of Representatives, announced
plans Thursday to file an appeal to the
Supreme Court on an expedited basis, after
the Fifth Circuit Court kept former Rep.
Tom DeLay on the ballot. The plan means
that the state GOP will bypass any chance
for en banc review in the Circuit Court, and
go directly to the Supreme Court.
The case potentially could result in a
clarification of states' power to decide when
a candidate for the national legislature has
lost eligibility-an issue that implicates the
constitutional definition of qualifications for
a congressional candidate.
Tina Benkiser, chair of the state party, said
in a statement that the GOP considers DeLay
no longer eligible to be a candidate, because
he has moved to Virginia and plans to
remain there. He resigned from the House in
April, amid spreading difficulties over
campaign finance and lobbying scandals and
said he would not run for reelection. He
resigned after he had won the GOP primary
in Texas' 22d congressional district in
March; for the time being, he remains on the
ballot.
James Bopp, Jr., the attorney for the state
Republicans, said the state's Democratic
Party had sued to keep DeLay on the ballot
in order to force him to formally withdraw
"so that their nominee runs unopposed, or to
force Tom DeLay to run . . . so that their
nominee will be running against a candidate
that is ineligible to serve. This makes a
mockery of our democratic system and
denies voters a meaningful choice."
If DeLay is ineligible, under state law, he
can be replaced on the ballot. If he
withdraws, however, it is too late to replace
him, according to state law.
Democrats want DeLay on the ballot
because they believe his highly publicized
troubles with the law create a campaign
issue and thus a greater opportunity for their
candidate, former Rep. Nick Lampson. They
also contend that replacing DeLay now
would harm Lampson's chances of winning
by changing a campaign that is well under
way and would require Democrats to raise
new funds to pay for a changed election
strategy.
The Fifth Circuit, in a 25-page ruling,
available here, ruled that GOP chair
Benkiser had acted unconstitutionally on
June 7 in declaring DeLay ineligible for the
ballot. The Constitution requires a member
of the House to reside in a state on the day
of election, the Circuit Court said, so
declaring DeLay ineligible in June adds an
invalid residency qualification for the office.
The Court also ruled that the GOP had no
followed the standards of the state law on
candidate eligibility because it has not been
"conclusively established" that DeLay
would not be a resident of Texas on election
day. Although records showing that DeLay
lives in Virginia now, the Court said that is
not enough to prove he will not be a Texas
resident when the election is held in
November.
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In appealing to the Supreme Court, the
Texas GOP expects not only to challenge the
ruling on the constitutional issue, but also to
contest the state Democrats' right to bring
the challenge at all (the "standing" issue).
Since the Circuit Court also refused to issue
a stay pending appeal, the GOP is also likely
to seek a stay from the Supreme Court, or
from Justice Antonin Scalia as the Circuit
Justice. At present, state officials are barred
by a District Court injunction from taking
DeLay's name off the ballot, and the GOP is
barred from naming a replacement.
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"DeLay Departing On Own Terms
First, Congressman Wanted to Defeat GOP Challengers"
The Washington Post
April 5, 2006
R. Jeffrey Smith and Jonathan Weisman
Under siege from state and federal probes
into his actions and those of his closest aides
and advisers, Rep. Tom DeLay had
considered resigning on several occasions
over the past four months. But he waited
until after he had vanquished his challengers
in the Republican primary to deny them the
chance to become his successor, associates
said.
DeLay's decision was also provoked by
recent poll results that showed he faced a
stiff challenge in November, the associates
said.
They also cited what the Texas Republican
has privately described at his frustration at
no longer being a part of the House
leadership, and his diminished satisfaction
with rank-and-file congressional life. The
lawmaker was forced to relinquish the post
of majority leader after being indicted in
Texas on a felony money-laundering charge
last October; he had served in the job since
2002 and had been majority whip before
then.
DeLay's decision allowed him to set the
terms of his departure, avoiding what could
have been a personally devastating loss at
the polls in November. DeLay was
determined to hang on to his seat at least
through the primary, said Carl Forti,
spokesman for the National Republican
Congressional Committee. That was because
he considered his three Republican
challengers gadflies and traitors and he was
determined to try to block them from
succeeding him.
Several associates said DeLay was
particularly influenced by poll results he
received after his victory in the Republican
primary on March 7, which made clear that
his "negatives" in the district-a routine tally
of voters' emotional hostility toward him-
were high. That meant a close race would be
won only with substantial effort and cash.
An additional impetus for putting off the
resignation until now was suggested by John
Feehery, a former aide to DeLay and House
Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.). "He
needed to raise money for the defense fund.
That was the bottom line," Feehery said. "He
wanted to make sure he could take care of
himself in the court of law." Under federal
campaign rules, any reelection money a
lawmaker raises can be used to pay legal
fees stemming from official duties.
DeLay's decision to resign from the chamber
he once ruled with a clenched fist gave some
Republicans hope that the party can move
beyond a burgeoning corruption scandal as
the congressional election season heats up.
That scandal so far has led to guilty pleas to
corruption charges by lobbyist Jack
Abramoff, once a close ally of DeLay's, and
former DeLay aides Michael Scanlon and
Tony C. Rudy, who worked with Abramoff
after leaving their Capitol Hill jobs.
But Democrats vowed that they would not
let their opponents slip the noose of what
they have labeled a "culture of corruption."
"When a person steps down, it inflates the
severity of the situation, and if they think
after Tony Rudy, Jack Abramoff and the
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other guys the country will stop debate on
these issues, they've got another thing
coming," Rep. Rahm Emanuel (Ill.),
chairman of the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee, said yesterday.
"Federal prosecutors don't care about
Republican spin."
In a lengthy videotaped statement, DeLay
formally said he will resign the suburban
Houston seat he has held for 11 terms,
taking his trademark jabs at "liberal
Democrats" eager for an election fight and
those he said are ready to misinterpret his
every move.
"With the news of my decision, there of
course will be great speculation among the
political pundits and media about my
reasons both for this decision and its timing.
I'm quite certain most will put forth their
opinions and conclusions devoid of and
unencumbered by accuracy, facts and truth,"
he said. "I have no fear whatsoever about
any investigation into me or my personal or
professional activities."
The associates acknowledged that DeLay
made his decision against the backdrop of a
felony criminal charge in Texas that is
unlikely to be resolved quickly, and amid
growing interest by the Justice Department
and the FBI in his family finances and the
official actions he took at the behest of aides
who recently pleaded guilty to involvement
in a criminal conspiracy.
But DeLay-as well as his associates-said
the decision resulted from his desire to avoid
a defeat at the hands of voters in his district
rather than a calculated effort to deflect any
investigation.
GOP leaders were quick to praise the man
who helped secure Republican control of the
House and turn Washington into a bastion of
Republican support. But when pushed,
several Republicans conceded that DeLay
bore some responsibility for the scandals
that drove him from power-scandals that
reached into his House leadership offices.
"At the end of the day, the members are
responsible for what happens in their offices
and are responsible for their staff," said
House Majority Leader John A. Boehner (R-
Ohio), who now occupies the leadership
suite where Rudy and Abramoff say they
traded funds and favor for legislative action.
"And clearly, there were several . . . former
staffers for Tom who ran off the road, and it
is sad and unfortunate."
DeLay's potential legal challenges have
increased in the past three months, as
Abramoff, Scanlon and Rudy struck deals
with a federal task force to gain reduced
prison terms in exchange for their
cooperation in a continuing public
corruption probe. DeLay alluded in a Time
magazine interview this week to being "hit"
as a result of Abramoffs guilty plea in
January.
As a government official familiar with the
investigation said, a noteworthy aspect of
the plea deals is the "dramatic premium" the
Justice Department evidently places on
obtaining information that might implicate
others. For DeLay, this official said, "the
federal case is going to get worse before it
gets better."
But Richard Cullen, a key member of
DeLay's defense team, said the resignation
decision was not provoked by anything
federal investigators have recently said.
Several of DeLay's associates said that
yesterday's announcement was jarring only
to those not privy to DeLay's political
anxieties stretching back to the 2004 race,
when he won by his slimmest margin ever.
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"You get concerned" when you barely win
against a middling opponent, a top DeLay
adviser said.
Starting in December, DeLay's private
polling pointed out serious political
problems. At first, it suggested a roughly
even voter split with former congressman
Nick Lampson, the Democratic nominee.
But it also showed that nearly eight in 10
voters were already firmly decided on one of
the two candidates-a rarity for a House race,
especially considering that the general
election was 11 months away. That meant
changing minds would be costly.
The March 7 primary in which DeLay
defeated three little-known Republicans with
62 percent provided a temporary boost for
his campaign. But a poll DeLay
commissioned two weeks ago to measure his
progress with voters since December found
no shift in the overall electorate since
January.
That survey stoked concern in the DeLay
operation because he had experienced a
relatively positive run of media coverage in
the past few months, and some fretted that if
that was his high-water mark, he would be
hard-pressed to win in November. The tally
weighed heavily on DeLay after it was
presented to him last week.
Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-Tex.), one of
DeLay's strongest allies, said that although
the former majority leader had "a sense of
euphoria" after winning his primary race,
this elation evaporated after he realized he
would have to raise as much as $10 million
to compete in the general election.
DeLay discussed his decision with Cullen
last Wednesday, and he started informing
others about it on Thursday. Few lawmakers
or associates tried to talk him out of it, one
of his advisers and others said.
"I don't think there was encouragement [for
him to leave], but I think there's a great deal
of relief," Feehery said. "It was a soap opera,
and people are tired of soap operas. They
want to get to work."
With DeLay expected to be out of Congress
by mid-June, the National Republican
Congressional Committee and Texas
Republican officials expressed confidence
that Republicans could easily retain a district
that gave President Bush 64 percent of the
vote in 2004. Former GOP congressman
Steve Stockman, who threatened to run in
the general election as an independent, said
he may run as a Republican instead, joining
a wide field of potential DeLay successors.
They include Sugar Land Mayor David
Wallace, who is organizing a campaign;
Harris County Judge Robert Eckels; Tom
Campbell, the second-place finisher in last
month's Texas primary; Houston City
Council member Shelley Sekula-Gibbs;
former state district judge John Devine; and
state Rep. Robert Talton.
DeLay said he would move his official
residence to Alexandria and vowed to stay
involved in grass-roots conservative causes
and expand a foster-care program he started
in Texas.
Friends and associates of DeLay say they
think he can make a prosperous future for
himself as a corporate-paid legislative
strategist, book author and speaker.
Wash ingtonpost. com staff writer Chris
Cillizza in Washington and Post staff writers
Juliet Eilperin, Jim VandeHei and Jeffrey H.
Birnbaum in Washington and Sylvia Moreno
in Sugar Land, Tex., contributed to this
report.
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